

IT'S NOT JUST NUKES: PLANS TO SPREAD OTHER WEAPONS TO ALL CORNERS OF THE GLOBE — AND BEYOND

WEAPONS IN SPACE: THE FINAL FRONTIER

SPACE REMAINS THE LAST MAJOR WEAPONS-FREE SANCTUARY — but it may not stay that way for long. Right now, the Pentagon is seeking something it calls “space dominance.” If it has its way, the heavens could become shooting galleries. This has the potential to jeopardize commercial and civilian satellites, and to threaten national and international security.

In more than four decades of space activity, no country has ever fully deployed operational space-based weapons. This could change if programs currently in development are realized.

Space weapons could take different forms. One would be orbiting satellites that carry technology capable of intercepting or disabling other satellites or missiles. Another would be satellites that carry weapons capable of hitting targets on earth. There are also weapons on the ground that are capable of interfering with satellites or their ground-based systems.

Even at the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and the former Soviet Union refrained from breaking the taboo against space warfare. They recognized that we all had far more to lose than to gain.

The Bush administration entered office in 2001 determined to reverse decades of U.S. space policy. Four years later, in 2005, official Air Force doctrine includes a “requirement” to deploy U.S. weapons to “dominate” and “control” space. Pentagon documents detail space warfare operations and strategy.

The administration is pursuing different types of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) and space-based elements of a “defense” system intended to intercept missiles launched against the U.S. or its allies. (The latter remains a technical fantasy.) The administration has begun preparations to test a ground-based ASAT in FY07, and a satellite carrying missile interceptors in 2010.

REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL FROM NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

From Public Citizen fact sheet, 2006

Reprocessing is the separation of uranium and plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel, touted as a solution to the country’s nuclear waste problem.



Reprocessing weakens the global non-proliferation regime to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-useable materials. Both the Ford and Carter administrations instituted a “no reprocessing” policy in the U.S. in order to convince other countries to

forego this technology. Recommencing reprocessing in the U.S. would send a signal to the rest of the world that the U.S. intends to extract plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons, at a time when the U.S. is seeking to discourage other nations (such as

North Korea and Iran) from acquiring such technologies. Reprocessing does not eliminate the need for a nuclear waste repository, nor does it significantly reduce the radioactivity of the waste that must be stored in a repository.

MISSILE DEFENSE: THE MOST EXPENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEM IN HISTORY — AND IT DOESN'T WORK

What is the single most costly weapons system in the Pentagon budget? And what do we get for that money?

The answers: Missile defense. And nothing.

How much have we spent? Over \$100 billion. And what have we gotten in return? The system has failed in five out of 11 tests, including all three since 2004.

From Lt. General Robert Gard (USA, Ret.) & John D. Isaacs, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation | July 2006

The Pentagon’s ground-based, mid-course missile defense system (GMD), formerly called by the more descriptive name National Missile Defense, is being developed and deployed to intercept one or a very few warheads launched by inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) against the U.S. The administration is requesting \$10.4 billion for missile defense, the largest single program in the FY07 Pentagon budget... [The total request for missile defense for FY07 is actually \$11.1 billion, including the Space Based Infrared System that is being designed to detect missile launches.]

Missile defense system unable to deal with decoys and countermeasures

Even with all the components in place and functioning as intended, it is highly doubtful that the ground-based mid-course system will be able to consistently and reliably intercept incoming warheads during their mid-course flight in space.

Several authoritative non-governmental organizations and individual experts have concluded that the currently planned national missile defense system will be unable to counter a missile attack that employs even relatively unsophisticated decoys or other countermeasures, which are readily available to any nation capable of developing an inter-continental ballistic missile.

It is apparent that astronomical amounts are being spent on national missile defense, a system that has a very low probability of functioning effectively and given the opportunity costs, the system should be accorded low priority, even if the prospects for success were more favorable...

It is irresponsible to squander such large amounts on national missile defense when there are higher priority defense and domestic programs that remain under-funded.

At the current rate of expenditures, for example, Russian nuclear weapons and materials will not be secured until 2020 and weapons grade nuclear materials worldwide will not be secured until 2030. It is far more likely that rogue states or terrorists will obtain a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials and smuggle a nuclear device into the U.S. than delivering one by an ICBM.

making
sense
of the



NUCLEAR WEAPONS



STILL A THREAT — NOW MORE THAN EVER

MANY OF US LET GO OF OUR ANXIETY ABOUT NUCLEAR ANNIHILATION when the Cold War ended in the 1980s. It appeared that common sense would finally take over, and the world would disarm with all due speed. Unfortunately, we still face serious — and growing — threats from nuclear weapons.

For one, the U.S. and the Soviet Union had spent decades building up vast nuclear arsenals. And while both have started to reduce their stockpiles, thousands remain; and since they are aging, there is a move to replace them.

In addition, a pro-nuclear weapons establishment in the U.S. has resisted the move to get rid of nuclear weapons, and has actively sought new missions for them. (This includes the nuclear weapon laboratories, and some military and political leaders.) Indeed, they are actively seeking funds to develop new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, other countries have developed nuclear capabilities; and new ones are pursuing them. It's very difficult to monitor and control nuclear materials in these countries.

Finally, the greatest nuclear threat comes from another source altogether: that is, a terrorist group. In the 2004 presidential debates, both George W. Bush and John Kerry agreed that the greatest potential security threat to the U.S. is the prospect of a terrorist group getting hold of a nuclear weapon.

Given all this, it's high time to get nuclear weapons back into the forefront of the national debate. The U.S. needs to play an active role in disarming; in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; and in locating and locking down all nuclear materials.

"Nuclear weapons are unique among weapons of mass destruction: they unleash the enormous energy stored in the tiny nucleus of an atom, an energy that is a million times larger than that stored in the rest of the atom. The nuclear explosion releases an immense amount of blast energy and thermal and nuclear radiation, with deadly immediate and delayed effects on the human body. Over 100,000 human beings died in the Hiroshima blast, and nuclear weapons in today's arsenals have a total yield of over 200,000 Hiroshima bombs."

—from a letter to President George W. Bush from
13 prominent physicists, 2006

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**Women's Action for New Directions
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WHY IS THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE RESUMING?

How has this come to be?

LESSONS LOST


By Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 60th Anniversary Issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November/December 2005

During the last 60 years, we missed several opportunities to contain the nuclear threat. It's not too late to learn from our mistakes.

"The hope of civilization," President Harry S. Truman said in his message to Congress in October 1945, "lies in international arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb." One month later, Truman joined the leaders of Britain and Canada to propose to the new United Nations that all atomic weapons be eliminated and that nuclear technology for peaceful purposes be shared under stringent international controls. By 1946, he had a detailed plan that included many of the nuclear nonproliferation proposals still debated today, including a ban on the production of new weapons and fissile material for weapons; international control of nuclear fuel; a strict inspection regime; and complete nuclear disarmament.

But in the U.S., opponents of the proposal said America should hold on to its nuclear monopoly. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin wanted his own bombs. Both nations opted to seek security through atomic arsenals, not atomic treaties. The end result? The number of nuclear weapons grew from the two fission bombs held by the United States in November 1945 to more than 27,000 nuclear and thermonuclear bombs held by eight or nine nations today.

Now, as then, there is a clash of strategies. Proposals to reduce stockpiles, end production of nuclear weapon materials, increase international controls, and create new mechanisms for producing nuclear fuel vie with strategies to deploy new nuclear weapons, preserve large nuclear arsenals indefinitely, block selected nations from getting nuclear technology, and counter proliferation through military action. The nuclear expansionists defend these latter strategies as "new thinking" best suited to an era when terrorists and rogue nations can ignore arms control treaties and exploit our supposedly naïve faith in international law. But, as the history of the last six decades reveals, this so-called new thinking has time and again led us down a dead end.



THOSE WHO DO NOT REMEMBER HISTORY ARE BOUND TO REPEAT IT

Rarely has this saying been more telling. It appears that many of the world's leaders have lost the sense of just how horrific a nuclear bomb blast can be. As the years wear on, we are losing the first hand participants: those who built the bomb, who witnessed the bomb, and who survived the bomb.

The bombs that the U.S. dropped on Japan during WWII devastated the cities for many years. We are obligated to remember these events, and to prevent them from ever happening again.


Hiroshima: On August 6, 1945 the nuclear weapon Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima by the Enola Gay, a U.S. Air Force B-29 bomber. It immediately killed an estimated 100,000 people and

heavily damaged 80% of the city. In the following months, an estimated 60,000 more people died from injuries or radiation poisoning. Since 1945, several thousand more *hibakusha* have died of illnesses caused by the bomb.

Nagasaki: On August 9, 1945 an atomic bomb exploded 500 meters above the city. The fierce blast wind, heat rays reaching several thousand degrees, and deadly radiation generated by the explosion crushed, burned and killed everything in sight and reduced the entire area to a barren field of rubble.

About one third of Nagasaki City was destroyed, and 150,000 people killed or injured; it was said at the time that this area would be devoid of vegetation for 75 years.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AROUND THE WORLD



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In 1961, President Kennedy had this to say:
 “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us . . . The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds . . .”

IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO STOP THE MADNESS?

So then, what should we do to make the world safer?

It all seems pretty discouraging; but in fact, there's much to inspire hope. And there are many smart people spending their lives pursuing sensible, sane strategies to get rid of the shadow of nuclear weapons once and for all.

Some of our friends at the Carnegie Endowment have published a book with a detailed approach to the problem.

The following is taken from a Carnegie study, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*. This report offers a blueprint strategy for strengthening efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

“UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY”


By George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica Mathews | 2005

The strategic aim of nonproliferation policy must now be to achieve universal compliance with the norms and terms of a deepened nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Compliance means more than signatures on treaties, or declarations of fine intent—it means actual performance. Universal means that all actors must comply with those norms and terms that apply to them. This includes states that have joined the NPT, and those that have not. It also includes nonstate actors—corporations and individuals. The burden of compliance extends not only to states seeking nuclear weapon capabilities through dual-use fuel cycle programs or those abetting proliferation through technology transfers; it also applies to nuclear weapon states that are not honoring pledges they have made.

Not all countries bear the same global responsibilities or face the same threats. It is unreasonable to expect all to be limited to the same capabilities. The current nuclear order gives five states the right to possess nuclear weapons and, as veto-holding members of the Security Council, great influence in setting and enforcing nonproliferation rules. To sustain—much less strengthen—this order, the “advantaged” minority must ensure that the majority perceives that it is beneficial and fair. Universal compliance seeks to achieve this balance of obligations. It tries to correct the impression that the states with nuclear weapons are getting much more out of the nonproliferation regime than are others. The name of the strategy itself is both a reminder of the ultimate goal and a guide to ensure that each tactical step moves toward that goal.

Progress toward universal compliance necessarily will be uneven. Attention and resources should be concentrated first and foremost on redressing the most pressing threats: those most likely to lead to nuclear use or to spreading waves of proliferation and instability.



Five obligations form the core of the universal compliance strategy. Their successful fulfillment will answer the most pressing proliferation problems. As sketched here and detailed in the report, each of these general objectives requires subsidiary national and international policies, resources, and institutional reforms. Some of the necessary steps require new international and national laws and voluntary codes of conduct, while others require only the will to live up to existing commitments.

- **No New Nuclear Weapon States.** Non-nuclear weapon states must reaffirm commitments never to acquire nuclear weapons. This commitment must evolve to proscribe the further national acquisition of facilities that can produce materials directly usable in nuclear weapons (separated plutonium and HEU). The United States and other nations must, in turn, provide a guaranteed supply of the fuel and services necessary for nuclear energy.
- **Secure all Nuclear Materials.** All states must maintain robust standards and mechanisms for securing, monitoring, and accounting for all fissile materials in any form. Such mechanisms are necessary both to prevent nuclear terrorism and to create the potential for secure nuclear disarmament.
- **Stop Illegal Transfers.** Nations must establish enforceable prohibitions against individuals, corporations, and states assisting others in secretly acquiring the technology, material, and know-how needed for nuclear weapons.
- **Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear Weapons.** All states must honor their obligations to end nuclear explosive testing, and must diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and international politics. They must also identify and strive to create the conditions necessary to eliminate all nuclear arsenals verifiably.
- **Commit to Conflict Resolution.** States that possess nuclear weapons must use their leadership to resolve regional conflicts that compel or excuse some states' pursuit of security by means of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

AND MORE HELPFUL NEWS

And what about the prospect of nuclear terrorism?

Securing the Bomb 2006 | From the Nuclear Threat Initiative, founded by Ted Turner and former Senator Sam Nunn

The attacks of September 11 were a wake-up call telling us that the terrorists' capacity for killing is limited only by the power of their weapons. Former Senator Sam Nunn has summarized our new situation: "We are in a new arms race between terrorist efforts to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and our efforts to stop them."

To win this race, the U.S. needs a strategy to secure these weapons and materials immediately on a global basis. This must be our government's highest priority – and so far, it is not. There is a huge gap that must be closed between the threat and our government's response...

Fortunately, concrete steps are available which could greatly reduce the danger. As former Senator Sam Nunn has said, "terrorists are racing to get weapons of mass destruction. We need to be racing to stop them."

A comprehensive program to:

- secure and account for the world's nuclear stockpiles;
- detect and block nuclear smuggling;
- shrink oversized nuclear complexes and re-employ weapons scientists and technicians who are no longer needed (to relieve the desperation that might tempt someone to sell nuclear materials or nuclear knowledge);
- monitor these dangerous stockpiles;
- end further production of potential bomb material; and
- reduce the vast stockpiles of bomb material built up over the decades of the Cold War,

would have an excellent chance of preventing terrorists from ever getting a nuclear bomb or the means to make one, and of stopping hostile states from following this route to the bomb.

Because these nuclear stockpiles exist in states all over the world, this is a threat that can only be addressed through cooperation on a global scale – it cannot be solved through forces of arms, or through improved defenses alone.

International treaties seek to contain proliferation

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits any nuclear explosion, whether for weapons or peaceful purposes. The Treaty establishes an organization to ensure implementation. All but three of 44 nations (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have signed the CTBT; 31 of the Annex 2 states (those that have nuclear weapons or nuclear facilities whose signature and ratification are required to bring the treaty into force) have ratified the treaty. Of the 13 states that have signed but not ratified the treaty, the notable exceptions are the U.S. and China.

In 1961, President Kennedy had this say:

"Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us . . . The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds . . ."

International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol

The IAEA began an effort in 1993 to better constrain NPT member-states' ability to illicitly pursue nuclear weapons after secret nuclear weapons programs in Iraq and North Korea exposed weaknesses in existing agency safeguards. That effort produced a voluntary Additional Protocol, designed to strengthen existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) only use nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes. The IAEA is responsible for validating that NPT states/parties are


complying with the treaty, which bars all states except China, France, Russia, the UK, and the U.S. from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The U.S. signed and ratified an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, the U.S. has not yet adopted the necessary implementing legislation for it to become law. President Bush transmitted the protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent on May 9, 2002. In his transmittal letter, Bush wrote that U.S. ratification of an Additional Protocol will "greatly strengthen our ability to promote universal adoption" of Additional Protocols, which "will contribute significantly to our nonproliferation objectives."

—*Arms Control Association, January 2005*

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty [FMCT] would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In July 2004, the Bush administration announced that while the U.S. still supported a legally binding treaty banning production of nuclear materials for weapons—usually referred to as a fissile material cutoff treaty, or FMCT—it no longer supported including verification measures in such a treaty.

Since many other countries support a verified fissile cutoff, this new position made successful negotiation of an agreement in the near term even less likely than before. Even before the Bush administration's announcement, however, negotiation of an FMCT had been stymied for years and seemed to have little likelihood of moving forward soon.



DO AS WE SAY, NOT AS WE DO...

The proliferation of nuclear weapons

In 2006, the news has been full of stories about nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and how they're creeping to other countries all over the world. Much of the noise is over who gets to have them, when, and why. At issue is whether the countries have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and what that means for the rest of us.

NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM

North Korea has a nuclear program which began after 1970 and was "frozen" in 1994 under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. This agreement began to break down in late 2002, when North Korea was accused of operating a uranium enrichment program. A new agreement has not been reached. North Korea may now have reprocessed enough plutonium for up to nine nuclear weapons.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and the Six-party Talks

Daniel A. Pinkston, Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies | April 2006

On September 19, 2005, representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States signed a statement of principles that included a commitment by North Korea to abandon all of its nuclear programs. However, the implementation of the statement ran into immediate obstacles, and now some analysts believe the six-party process is in danger of collapsing.

In April 2006, representatives from the delegations to the Six-party Talks attended an academic conference in Tokyo with the hope of jumpstarting another round of talks; however, their efforts proved to be unsuccessful. The major obstacles to re-starting this diplomatic effort include Pyongyang's insistence on its right to use peaceful nuclear technology, and Washington's efforts to address North Korea's alleged illicit activities such as counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

IRAN PURSUING NUCLEAR POWER

Originally started under the Shah of Iran in the 1950s, with the help of the U.S., the Iranian nuclear program is an effort to develop nuclear technology. After the 1979 revolution, the program was temporarily disbanded. It was soon resumed, albeit with less Western assistance than in the pre-revolution era.

Iran's current nuclear program consists of several research sites, a uranium mine, a nuclear reactor, and uranium processing facilities. The Iranian government asserts that the program's only goal is peaceful nuclear power generation, and plans to generate 6000MW of electricity with nuclear power plants by 2010.

Iran states the purpose of its nuclear program as the generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the NPT, of which it is a signatory (but has threatened to withdraw from), as well as being against Iranian religious principles

(although Pakistan, also a Muslim country, has nuclear weapons).

The U.S. says our stated primary concern with Iran's obtaining nuclear weapons is that we accuse Iran of sponsoring international terrorism. The U.S. maintains that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil reserves since nuclear power is more expensive for the Iranians to generate than oil-fired power.

About the possibility that the U.S. might take military action against Iran, WAND has this to say (July 2006):

"The Iran situation must be resolved through diplomacy. The key to resolving the crisis is U.S. engagement with Iran. The U.S. government should enter into direct talks with Iran aimed at resolving the nuclear situation. The U.S. should offer inducements—such as a pledge to refrain from military action, the lifting of economic sanctions, and the release of frozen Iranian financial assets—in exchange for Iranian agreement to accept binding non-proliferation commitments. A strategy of diplomatic engagement is the surest means of serving U.S. interests and enhancing regional and international security."

INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL

In March 2006, President Bush visited India and negotiated a deal for the U.S. to help India develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In return India will allow international inspectors to visit some of its nuclear sites.

The agreement sounds simple enough, but it is fraught with controversy and peril. India has not signed the NPT, yet it has successfully developed and tested nuclear weapons. The treaty has been a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. It is the main tool we use for holding treaty signers like Iraq and Iran accountable for their nuclear activities.

The NPT is one of the most successful international agreements ever crafted. Largely because of the NPT, today there are just seven declared nuclear powers and three possible ones.

Under the terms of the NPT, no signatory is supposed to help a non-signatory nation develop nuclear capacity. So the new U.S.-India deal feels like a step back from the NPT, and critics warn the deal will speed up the crumbling of the NPT already underway. Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) said the deal is a, "...historic failure of this President to tackle the real nuclear threats that we face. With one simple move the President has blown a hole in the nuclear rules that the entire world has been playing by and broken his own word to assure that we will not ship nuclear technology to India without the proper safeguards."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET: THEY'RE BAAACK

U.S. nuclear arsenal: what do we have; what do we want?

During the Cold War, the U.S. amassed a stockpile of nuclear weapons that is still intact today. As of January 2006, the U.S. had 5,735 active nuclear warheads, with another 4,235 held in reserve.

This would appear to be a sufficient number. Especially since the international stakes have shifted dramatically: The enemies that pose the most persistent and likely threat are now terrorist organizations — not Communist states with their own

nuclear arsenals. We have much more to fear from terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons or nuclear materials; we have much more to gain by containing the world's nukes: locking down weapons and materials, discouraging new nukes.

Still, it appears that this administration is pursuing a different path. Indeed, each fiscal year they request funding for programs to develop and build a new generation of nuclear weapons.

BUT THE NEW ONES WOULD BE SO MUCH FRIENDLIER: PLANS FOR NEW NUKES

WHAT IS A MINI-NUKE?

Proponents of nuclear weapons like to promote the idea of “low-yield” nuclear weapons (with a yield of less than five kilotons). They believe that these weapons may be perceived as less of a weapon of mass destruction and, therefore, more acceptable to be used on the battlefield. Still, the concept of “low-yield” is deceptive: at five kilotons, it is half the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The current official procedures for nuclear weapons (as outlined by the administration in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review) calls for developing low-yield nuclear weapons with a range of capabilities. These would be to attack movable targets, destroy chemical or biological weapons, and limit so-called collateral damage (that is, killing the local population and destruction of surrounding areas).

WHAT IS A NUCLEAR BUNKER BUSTER?

Formally known as the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” (RNEP), the bunker buster is a proposed new warhead intended to destroy deeply buried military facilities or storage bunkers by burrowing underground before exploding. The Pentagon suggests that a nuclear weapon can do this job better than the conventional bunker busters we already have. Congress has rejected funding for the RNEP twice.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD (RRW)

From Friends Committee on National Legislation fact sheet, March 2006

The Bush administration is intent on developing another class of nuclear weapons, the so-called *Reliable Replacement Warhead*, or RRW. It is a program to replace current nuclear warheads.

Researching and developing a new generation of “reliable” nuclear weapons could undermine arms control and nonproliferation objectives by setting off a nuclear arms race. It sends the wrong message to other would-be nuclear powers around the world. The program could lead to the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing and end the current international testing moratorium.

Despite the “reliable” label of the proposed new program, the current U.S. arsenal is extremely reliable. The secretaries of Energy and Defense have certified to the president for the past nine years that the present U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe, secure — and reliable. The program will cost billions of dollars. As a former White House budget official in the first Bush and Clinton administrations stated, “The weapons labs are more interested in job security than national security.”

ADMINISTRATION SEEKS RETURN TO COLD WAR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. PLANS TO PRODUCE 125 NEW NUKES A YEAR.

David Culp, Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers) | April 6, 2006

The Bush administration unveiled plans [in April 2006] to produce 125 new nuclear weapons a year. The plans include building a new nuclear bomb plant at an existing weapons site. The multi-billion dollar proposal was presented at a Capitol Hill hearing by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the semi-autonomous federal agency in charge of nuclear weapons...

NNSA deputy administrator Tom D’Agostino told a panel of the House Armed Services Committee yesterday that the plan “would restore us to a level of capability comparable

to what we had during the Cold War.”

“For all the talk about eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the administration is proposing that the U.S. return to Cold War era levels of nuclear weapons production capability,” said David Culp, senior lobbyist at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. “This is a dangerous step in the wrong direction and will spur a new nuclear arms race. The U.S. cannot increase nuclear weapons production and tell the rest of the world to not build these weapons.”