| March
xx, 2003
The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20052
Dear Mr. President:
We are writing to you to convey our
grave concern about recent public revelations that suggest
that your Administration considers nuclear weapons as
a mere extension of the continuum of conventional options
open to the United States, and that your administration
may use nuclear weapons in the looming military conflict
in Iraq.
We note with grave concern the Los
Angeles Times report of Jan. 25 and 26 that your administration
is actively considering the use of U.S. nuclear weapons
in the event that Iraq attacks with chemical or biological
weapons, or to preemptively strike sites believed to
store or manufacture chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons.
What is more, according to a Jan. 31
Washington Times article, you approved a national security
directive that specifically allows for the use of nuclear
weapons in response to biological or chemical attacks,
apparently changing a decades-old U.S. policy of deliberate
ambiguity. According to the article, National Security
Presidential Directive 17 states, The United States
will continue to make clear that it reserves the right
to respond with overwhelming force including the United
States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies. Such
language suggests that the administration is prepared
to use nuclear weapons first to respond to non-nuclear
WMD threats thereby increasing reliance on nuclear weapons.
This shift in U.S. nuclear policy threatens
the very foundation of nuclear arms control as shaped
by the 1970 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which
has helped to stem nuclear proliferation for over 30
years. In the context of our efforts to strengthen the
NPT, Washington issues a negative security assurance
in 1978 which was reiterated in 1995 that the United
States would not use its nuclear force against countries
without nuclear weapons unless the non-nuclear weapon
state was allied with a nuclear weapons possessor. On
February 22, 2002 State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher articulated a similar version:
The United States reaffirms that it
will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
state-parties to the Treaty of the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion
or any other attack on the United States, its territories,
its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a
state toward wish it has a security commitment carried
out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state
in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.
Though Iraq has sought in the past
and may continue to seek nuclear weapons, Iraq is a
State Party to the NPT and, according to the United
States on intelligence estimates, is not believed to
possess a nuclear explosive device. Abandoning our pledge
under the NPT would be to turn our backs on all nuclear
nonproliferation efforts since as the hub for the entire
nuclear arms control framework.
In addition, such a shift in U.S. policy
would deepen the dander of nuclear proliferation by
effectively telling non-nuclear states that nuclear
weapons are necessary to deter a potential U.S. attack,
and by sending a green light to the world s nuclear
states that it is permissible to use them. Is this the
lesson we want to send to North Korea, India, Pakistan
or any other nuclear power?
Nuclear weapons, with their unique
destructive power and their capacity to threaten the
very survival of humanity, have been kept separate from
other military alternatives out of a profound commitment
to do all we can to see they are never used again. It
makes no sense to break down the firewall that existed
for half a century between waging conventional warfare
and provoking a clash started or escalated by nuclear
weapons.
While we believe that the United States
must reserve the right to use overwhelming conventional
military force to deal with today s difficult security
challenges, we cannot support a policy that explicitly
contemplates the option of a nuclear response against
a non-nuclear state, in contradiction to our continued
commitments under the negative security assurances.
Lowering the threshold for the first-use of nuclear
weapons reduces incentives for other nations to adhere
to the international arms-control framework thus increasing
the dangers for nuclear warfare.
As the United States and its allies
confront a belligerent regime in Iraq, we urge you to
clarify for the American people and the international
community that your administration stands by the negative
security assurances and is not doing anything to undermine
our commitments under NPT. Every administration has
upheld this policy since it was first announced in 1978;
we are certain that such good judgment will stand the
test of time as we approach the challenges ahead.
Sincerely,
[signatures] |
