Women's Action for New Directions

NIX MOX BULLETIN BOARD
January, 2001


Welcome to the NIX MOX BULLETIN BOARD, a periodic posting of MOX-related news and resources. The purpose of the Bulletin Board is to help anti-MOX activists stay in touch with each other, share news and information, and network locally, regionally, nationally and internationally. Please send news to share to: mox@wand.org. Thanks for your help! (Click here if you are wondering, what is MOX?)

I. Anti-MOX Activism
A. A. License Intervention Sign-on Letter
B. BREDL Calls for New EIS
C. Activists Challenge CANDU MOX Tests
D. Job Opening: Nuclear Policy Associate

II.Program News
A. Licensing Process Update
B. Reactor Safeguards Cmte. to Address MOX
C. One for the Watchdogs
D. Holgate Heads Out

III. International MOX News
A. Russia
B. Canada
C. United Kingdom
D. Japan

IV. SRS and DOE News
A. Report Recommends Immobilization
B. Plutonium Shipments to SRS This Summer
C. Last Gasp from the US Breeder Program?

V. Resources and Web Pages
A. Reports
B. Fun Stuff

I. ANTI-MOX ACTIVISM

A. License Intervention Sign-on Letter

DEMAND FULL PUBLIC PROCESS
FOR MOX PLANT LICENSING

* * * SIGN-ONs REQUESTED * * *
DEADLINE JANUARY 31st

Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE), an Atlanta-based group planning on intervening in the licensing of the proposed MOX fabrication plant at the Savannah River Site (SRS), is requesting sign-ons for its letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) demanding that full courtroom proceedings be employed during the licensing process.

The NRC currently plans to use a "paper-only" process that would not allow for cross-examination, in-person expert testimony, discovery, or other basic procedural tools during consideration of the MOX plant license application. Formal adjudicatory proceedings would enhance public knowledge of the risks of the MOX plant - which is unprecedented in design and mission - and ensure a more rigorous approval process.

For a copy of the letter and to sign on, contact Glenn Carroll at atom.girl@mindspring.com
Deadline is January 31st.



B. BREDL Calls for New EIS

The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL) has called for a halt to the US MOX program and issuance of a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement in light of recent revelations that the proposed MOX fabrication plant would produce a "high activity alpha waste" stream never before managed at SRS.

The new waste generation estimates were included in an environmental report recently submitted to the DOE by the MOX contractor Duke-Cogema-Stone & Webster (see Section II. A. below).

Don Moniak of BREDL's Aiken, SC field office cited previously-unreported estimates that 80,000 gallons of "high activity alpha waste" would be produced by the MOX plant as well as 7,500 times more low-level waste than reported in the Final EIS, and five times more transuranic waste. The environmental report also describes facility operations as lasting 20 years, rather than the 10 years reported in the Final EIS.

Press release and copy of letter to DOE available at:
www.bredl.org/press/2001/plutonium_fuel_facility.htm



C. Activists Challenge CANDU MOX Tests

In late January twenty-five organizations from three countries petitioned the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to halt tests of MOX fuel in its CANDU reactors. The tests would be carried out under the joint US-Russian Parallex Program which seeks to determine the feasibility of weapons MOX use in Canadian Deuterium-Uranium (CANDU) reactors.

Both Russia and the US have in the last year shipped MOX test assemblies to the Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. Chalk River nuclear laboratories in eastern Ontario as part of the program, despite considerable protest from US and Canadian citizens and First Nations tribal members.

Among the problems cited concerning the MOX CANDU tests:

  • plutonium-rich agglomerates were found in similar experimental MOX fuel pellets used in the US, indicating Los Alamos Laboratory (where the fuel was fabricated both for the earlier test and for the Parallex Program) was not following proper quality assurance guidelines

  • in 1998 Los Alamos fabricated fourteen batches of text MOX fuel which did not meet technical specifications

  • the use of aging and sub-standard fuel fabrication equipment at Los Alamos

Besides the risks, the Parallex tests is entirely unnecessary -- the US announced last year that it would not use CANDU reactors as part of its disposition efforts, and a National Academy of Sciences report indicates that the plutonium in MOX used in CANDU reactors will not meet the required "spent fuel standard" for plutonium disposition.

Many thanks to BREDL and the Nuclear Control Institute for initiating the letter to CNSC. Letter and news release: www.bredl.org/sapc/index.htm.



D. Job Opening: Nuclear Policy Associate

Women's Action for New Directions (WAND) is hiring a staff person to work on nuclear policy and advocacy issues from our Washington DC office. Responsibilities include both Hill and grassroots work on a range of nuclear issues, including MOX.

Full job description and application information: click here.

II. PROGRAM NEWS

A. Licensing Process Update

In late December, MOX contractor Duke-Cogema-Stone & Webster (DCS) submitted an Environmental Report on the proposed MOX fabrication facility to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Report was an initial step toward the construction license application DCS will submit to the NRC -- expected by Feb. 28th.

The NRC will use the Report, along with the DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement on Plutonium Disposition, as the basis for an EIS on the MOX plant, signaling that minimal new research on environmental impacts of MOX fabrication can be expected.

The Environmental Report revealed previously undisclosed waste streams will be generated by the MOX plant, namely, "high activity alpha waste." It also indicated greater amounts of low-level and transuranic waste will be generated than was reported in the Final EIS and that the facility will operate for 20, rather than 10 years. (See Section I.B. above for activists' response.)

What now?

Public Meetings, Round I:
The NRC will review the report, then after DCS submits its construction permit in February, will hold public scoping meetings as part of the EIS process (these have not yet been scheduled). NRC plans to limit these hearings to discussion of whether the DCS application meets NRC design, quality assurance, safety and environmental requirements.

Public Meetings, Round II:
An operating license application is expected from DCS in mid-2002 which should cover more detailed design and safety issues. This application will also trigger public meetings which will address whether operation of the MOX plant will "adequately protect health, minimize danger to life or property, and control special nuclear material."

MORE INFORMATION:

NRC Public meetings:
Timothy C. Johnson
NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
301-415-7299

Environmental Report:
www.nrc.gov/NRC/NMSS/MOX/environ.html
(Thanks to Don Moniak for pressuring NRC to make this more accessible to the public)



B. Reactor Safeguards Cmte. to Address MOX

The NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hear a briefing and discussion from DOE and NRC staff on the proposed MOX fabrication facility on Friday, Feb. 2nd at its meeting at NRC headquarters in Rockville, MD.

Since most of us won't be in Rockville that day, look for a transcript on the ACRS website, www.nrc.gov/ACRSACNW/. Transcripts are a useful way to glean information not otherwise publicized and the ACRS website has an easy-to-use search engine to help you find what you need.



C. One for the Watchdogs

One of the most serious safety considerations for any plutonium processing facility is the potential for airborne releases of plutonium in the event of a fire. Preventing such releases is not the place to cut corners in facility design.

In late December, the DOE recommended that designers of the proposed Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility "consider" using sand filters in the plant rather than High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. This is a good recommendation - it needs to be followed (though sand filters have their limitations as well).

HEPA filters are cheaper to build than sand filters, but are problematic. A Blue Ribbon Panel assembled to examine alternatives to nuclear waste incineration acknowledged this when in early December, 2000 it included in its recommendations to DOE that HEPA filters undergo new testing to determine if they will be capable of protecting worker and public health in accident situations.

Among the problems:

From the Oak Ridge report:

"Filter retention efficiencies drastically lower than the 99.9%
quoted for ordinary particulate matter were observed with Pb-212, Es-253, and Pu-238 sources."

So although larger particles of plutonium may be caught by the filter, because of alpha decay, smaller particles can break off and escape the filter.

As design continues for the three proposed plutonium disposition facilities at SRS, MOX watchdogs should keep a close eye on decisions regarding essential safety components such as filtering systems.

MORE INFORMATION:



D. Holgate Heads Out

Laura Holgate, Director of DOE's Office of Fissile Material Disposition, will be leaving that post as of January 31st to take a position with the new Nunn-Turner "Nuclear Threat Initiative." As of this writing a new OFMD director had not been announced.

An avid MOX advocate (and former Nuclear Freeze activist, ironically), Holgate's most recent work focused on securing international funding for the Russian MOX program. (Thanks to Tom Clements of Nuclear Control Institute.)

III. INTERNATIONAL MOX NEWS

A. Russia

  1. Still No Contract for Russian MOX Work
    The DOE announced yet another delay in issuing its draft Request for Proposals for selection of a contractor to carry out plutonium disposition work (MOX) in Russia.

    After an earlier delay, expected release of the RFP was to be mid-December and a draft solicitation review conference was to be held in January, but the schedule is now delayed to "beyond those dates."

    Liability issues for MOX work in Russia have been a major sticking point with nuclear contractors -- the ongoing delays are a likely sign that these issues have yet to be resolved.

    See: www.ch.doe.gov/business/acq/ic/ic.htm
    (Thanks to Tom Clements.)

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  2. Waste Import Battle Continues
    Russian activists continue to fight action in the Duma that will clear the way for the import of up to 20,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from countries including Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Taiwan, South Korea, and China. Minatom proposes to store or reprocess the fuel for cash, generating an estimated $21 billion.

    In December, the State Duma lower house of parliament overwhelmingly approved an amendment that would allow for the import of nuclear waste, previously banned by Russian environmental law. A second vote by the State Duma, required before the measure is sent to the upper house (the Federation Council), is expected in February.

    Activists note that Russia has yet to deal with its own nuclear waste problems and waste imports will exacerbate environmental releases and health problems already plaguing the nuclear industry. Russia's rail and highway infrastructure - necessary for waste shipments - is also suffering from decades of neglect and jeopardizes safe transport.

    For more information and to add your voice to international opposition to this plan, contact:

    Natalia Mironova
    Movement for Nuclear Safety
    mnatalie@chat.ru



B. Canada

  1. CANDU Parallex Tests In mid-January, Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. (AECL) announced that it was about to begin tests of MOX fuel in its CANDU reactors at Chalk River in eastern Ontario. The tests are part of the joint US-Russian Parallex Program and are being challenged by anti-MOX activists as risky and unnecessary (see item I.C. above).

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  2. Pro-CANDU Report Released
    Meanwhile, the Canadian Association of Physicists (CAP) released a report in early January dismissing safety and proliferation concerns about using MOX in CANDU reactors, saying that the advantages of "getting rid of" Russian plutonium far outweighs safety and security drawbacks.

    While CAP acknowledges proliferation concerns of MOX by noting that "extra security and storage" would be required at MOX reactor sites, it bypasses the fact that Minatom has expressed a desire to re-extract plutonium from MOX at the end of the disposition program -- a fact that essentially nullifies the report's central arguments about the benefits of MOX.

    CAP also concludes that immobilization of plutonium in glass was just as feasible and safe as MOX (and could be achieved more quickly), though the MOX recommendation was highlighted in media articles generated by the report (Canada would not play a role in the immobilization option).

    Report available in PDF format at:
    www.cap.ca/scipol.htm



C. United Kingdom

  1. Another Attempt to Open Sellafield MOX Plant

    The UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) announced in late December that it approved BNFL's response to fifteen recommendations about its MOX Demonstration Facility made in the wake of a safety data falsification scandal in September, 1999.

    BNFL was required to satisfactorily respond to the recommendations or the MOX plant could not be reopened. As a result of NII's announcement, BNFL has said it will reopen a "small support plant" for the larger MOX fabrication facility, which has never been granted permission to operate.

    Currently, the decision to open the Sellafield MOX Plant lies with UK Environmental Minister Michael Meacher - but first BNFL must prove its economic viability. In order to break even it must operate at 30% - 40% of its "reference case" load, but currently only has 6.7% confirmed in contracts.

    After disastrous losses in 2000, BNFL is struggling to regain lost contracts and is heavily courting Japan, who cancelled contracts in the wake of the 1999 scandal. Sweden is also expected to announce a decision allowing for the Sellafield MOX plant to provide fuel to its commercial reactors. BNFL claims it has "customer commitments" that justify opening the plant and that it will present a revised economic analysis to the government to make its case.

    It is expected that no decision would be made before the next general election in early May, as the Labor Party does not want to become mired in nuclear controversy prior to an election. BNFL is pushing for an earlier decision.

    BNFL first petitioned in 1996 to open the plant, which has the capacity to process of 120 metric tons of heavy metal per year.

    (Thanks to Pete Roche of Greenpeace UK and David Lowry, environmental consultant in Stoneleigh England.)

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  2. DOE Report on BNFL
    In March, 2000, a coalition of environmental groups petitioned DOE to debar BNFL from contracts in the US in light of its safety data falsification scandal in the UK. In a response unannounced to the petitioners, the DOE released in June, 2000 a review of BNFL's safety and quality assurance practices at DOE sites in the US.

    Less than hard-hitting, the review concludes that while a few areas need careful monitoring, the likelihood that problems like those at Sellafield would occur in the US is low (a conclusion unrelated to the charges leveled by petitioners).

    Further, after a presumably thorough review that involved interviewing BNFL and DOE staff, the review panel offered glowing praise of BNFL project and operations teams as "high quality, experienced and dedicated personnel."

    Now don't you feel better?

    For copies of the DOE review, write to mox@wand.org.

    (Thanks to Bob Schaeffer, Public Policy Communications.)



D. Japan

  1. Second MOX Shipment Heads to Japan
    On January 19th the British armed freighters Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal departed the French port of Cherbourg carrying 32 MOX fuel assemblies containing 230 kg of plutonium for delivery in Japan. The fuel, produced by the Belgian nuclear corporation Belgonucleaire, is to be loaded in the Tokyo Electric (TEPCO) reactor Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit #3 in the Niigata region of western Japan.

    Greenpeace activists have protested the shipment in France and local protestors in Kariwa are trying to initiate a referendum that would allow a vote on whether to allow the use of plutonium fuel in the reactor. TEPCO has reportedly deployed 100 representatives to the town to dissuade people from supporting the referendum. TEPCO also announced it would scrap the MOX program if a majority of residents opposed it.

    The 18,000 mile journey via the Tasman Sea and South Pacific is expected to take about two months.

    MORE INFORMATION:

    (Thanks to Pete Roche, David Lowry, and Citizen's Nuclear Information Center.)

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  2. New Findings Raise MOX Safety Questions

    • Greenpeace Report
      On Dec. 26 Greenpeace International released a report citing new evidence that European-fabricated MOX fuel loaded in TEPCO reactors will increase the risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident.

      The report was prepared by Dr. Frank Barnaby of the Oxford Research Group and Greenpeace International and notes that the Belgian facility where the latest MOX fuel headed for Japan was fabricated is an aging plant with poor quality standards. The researchers note that "vital quality control checks are poorly applied if not completely disregarded" at the plant.

      For this report and other documents from Greenpeace, see:
      www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear/transport/mox00/documents.html

    • Green Action Analysis
      In a parallel development, the Japanese anti-nuclear group Green Action released a statistical analysis of Belgonucleaire quality control data conducted by Hideyuki Koyama of Osaka Prefecture University.

      Green Action exposed the 1999 BNFL data falsification scandal, and while less information is available about the Belgian fuel, the group says sufficient evidence exists to conclude quality control data has once again been falsified. The group is seeking an injunction to prevent the use of MOX shipped by Belgonucleaire as well as full release of quality control data from the company.

      (Thanks to Pete Roche and David Lowry.)

    IV. SRS AND DOE NEWS

    A. Report Recommends Immobilization

    On January 10th a DOE task force examining US nonproliferation efforts with Russia released a report suggesting that one way to the US could help secure excess Russian plutonium would be to purchase it from Russia and either store or immobilize it as waste.

    The report also supports existing MOX programs but is notable in its departure from the current US-Russian agreement that does not include an immobilization option of any kind for Russian plutonium.

    The document, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia," can be downloaded from the web (in PDF format) at:
    www.hr.doe.gov/seab/new.html.
    Scroll down to "Task Force on DOE Nonproliferation Programs with Russia."



    B. Plutonium Shipments to SRS This Summer

    The Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System at Rocky Flats, which has experienced numerous technical problems and delays, is scheduled to start in mid-March of this year, meaning shipments to SRS can be expected to begin in summer, 2001.

    The system is designed to stabilize and package plutonium metals and oxides, much of which is bound for the Savannah River Site for eventual disposition via immobilization. The system is operated by Rocky Flats site contractor Kaiser Hill using a technology designed by BNFL.

    For more information on the 9975 containers in which these shipments will be made (though final approval on use of this container is pending), see:
    http://augustachronicle.com/stories/011501/met_066-5053.000.shtml
    Link includes helpful graphic of the 9975 container.



    C. Last Gasp from the US Breeder Program?

    • EBR-II
      In January DOE announced the long-awaited completion of the draining of the liquid metal sodium coolant from the Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR-II) in Idaho. Draining of the sodium signifies an important point-of-no-return in shut-down of the reactor, a process which has taken since 1994 to complete.

      EBR-II was part of the failed US breeder reactor program and began operation in 1965. Breeder reactors, which operate on plutonium (MOX) fuel, are designed to produce more fuel than they consume, though they have proved an economic, safety and technological boondoggle and most have been shut down. As plutonium-producers, they pose significant proliferation problems.

    • FFTF
      Another reactor from the US breeder era is the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) in Washington state. DOE issued a Record of Decision this month to permanently deactivate the FFTF reactor. However, local supporters of FFTF have vowed to fight to save the reactor, which while slated for deactivation, still has not undergone sodium coolant draining. The fight continues...

    MORE INFORMATION:

    V. RESOURCES AND WEB PAGES

    A. Reports

    1. "Plutonium End Game"
      Institute for Energy and Environmental Research report
      Discusses management of commercial and weapons plutonium including failure of global reprocessing programs. (Jan. 2001)
      www.ieer.org/reports/pu/index.html

    2. International MOX Assessment
      Citizen's Nuclear Information Center and WISE Paris
      Analysis of health, safety, technological, economic, social, legal, and other aspects of international MOX use. (First release 1997, now available on web)
      www.cnic.or.jp/english/topics/plutonium/ima/

    3. DOE Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
      General Accounting Office report
      See p. 40 for discussion of high risk of waste, fraud and abuse in DOE contract management
      (can you say DCS?)

      Download from web in PDF format:
      www.gao.gov/pas/2001/pas01.html
      (scroll to rpt. # GAO-01-246)

    4. Managing the Nation's Nuclear Materials:
      The 2025 Vision for the Dept. of Energy

      A frightening vision indeed:

      • p. 23: US to make more weapons plutonium to enhance bargaining position with Russia
      • p. 39: Use of disposition facilities for plutonium fabrication mission
      • p. 45: New nuclear weapon "units" production estimated at 20-500/yr.

      http://lib-www.lanl.gov/infores/reports/whatsnew/20001211.htm
      Report # LA-UR-00-3489



    B. Fun Stuff

    1. Cartoons:
      Check out the latest from Tom MOX!
      www.thebird.org/~nixmox/tomox.html
      Brought to you to Atlanta PSR anti-MOX activist Tom Ferguson

    2. MOX Poster:
      Also from Tom Ferguson:
      Anti-MOX Poster:
      www.thebird.org/~nixmox/Poster.html

      Return to Nix MOX Bulletin Board Index



      The MOX BULLETIN BOARD is compiled by Women's Action for New Directions (WAND) Education Fund. For comments, suggestions, or to add or remove names from this distribution list, contact Pat Ortmeyer, WAND Field Director for Nuclear Waste Issues, at mox@wand.org or 406-327- 0785. Feel free to forward this bulletin, and please include acknowledgment of WAND.

What is MOX?

MOX
("mixed oxide") is nuclear reactor fuel made from a mixture of plutonium and uranium. The US Department of Energy is proposing to use plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads to make MOX fuel for use in commercial reactors. To learn more about MOX, see "The MOX Box" link at www.wand.org/getfacts/index/index.html.