NIX MOX BULLETIN BOARD
February, 2001
Welcome to the NIX MOX BULLETIN BOARD, a periodic posting of
MOX-related news and resources. The purpose of the Bulletin
Board is to help anti-MOX activists stay in touch with each other,
share news and information, and network locally, regionally,
nationally and internationally. Please send news to share to:
mox@wand.org.
Thanks for your help! (Click here if you are wondering,
what is MOX?)
- I. The Good News
- A. MOX Blocked in Japan
- B. Cold Feet in Canada
- C. Contractor Limbo
- D. MOX Fabrication Plant on Hold
- II.Program News
- A. MOX Plant Licensing
- B. Unresolved Questions
- C. Immobilization Takes a Back Seat - Again
- III. SRS and DOE Misc.
- A. Savannah River Site News:
- Leaking Tanks, Hidden Waste
- Useless Shipments
- B. In the DOE: Plutonium at Risk
- IV. International MOX News
- A. Great Britain
- Sellafield Struggles
- BNFL Looks for Cogema Contracts
- B. Russia
- Waste Import Battle: The MOX Connection
- Problems at Proposed MOX Reactor
- V. Resources and More
- A. Reports and Resources
- B. Articles
- C. Announcements
 NOTE
The National Energy Security Act of 2001 (S388 and S389) was introduced by Senator Frank Murkowski
on Feb. 26th. The bill goes a long way toward promoting a nuclear power revival in the US with implicit
support for widespread use of commercial MOX fuel. For more information on this legislation and other
pro-MOX proposals see the Nuclear Information and Resource Service website, www.nirs.org.
Several encouraging developments this month in the uphill battle against MOX:
A. MOX Blocked in Japan
As a result of public outcry, relentless work by activist groups, and safety concerns about MOX, Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato announced a ban on the use of MOX at Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s (Tepco) Fukushima power plant in Kyodo in an address to the prefectural assembly on Feb. 26th. He added that given recent accidents, safety concerns and public distrust, that it would be "impossible to start the use of MOX for quite some time."
The suspension of MOX at Fukushima threatens plans for plutonium fuel use throughout Japan. In the wake of Gov. Sato's announcement, Governor Ikuo Hirayama of Niiagata stated that he would not allow the prefecture's Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant to become the first to use MOX. The Asahi newspaper editorialized that the "outlook for MOX use is now completely unclear." The Denki newspaper speculated that the MOX ban in Fukushima "will probably affect the entire nuclear fuel cycle," including plans to reprocess spent fuel.
The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission immediately sounded the alarm that without MOX, Japan would be faced with growing stockpiles of plutonium - failing to note that phasing out nuclear power would be an effective way of preventing the increase of plutonium in the first place.
(Thanks to Aileen Mioko Smith of Green Action, Kyoto, Japan, Pete Roche of Greenpeace UK, and David Lowry, environmental consultant, Stoneleigh, England.)
B. Cold Feet in Canada
Citing concerns about cost, safety, liability and public backlash, Canada's nuclear utilities have said they are not ready to commit to the use of MOX fuel in CANDU reactors. (CANDU refers to "Canadian Deuterium-Uranium reactors.)
The use of MOX in CANDU reactors has been proposed as a way to increase the disposition rate of surplus Russian weapons plutonium - a scheme embraced by the Canadian government and for which tests have already begun at the Chalk River facility operated by Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Relying on its own reactor capacity, Russia would not be able to meet the proposed plutonium disposition rate of four metric tons per year.
But a large Canadian nuclear utility, Ontario Power Generation (OPG), which owns 20 CANDU reactors, has said it will not commit to MOX as it will exacerbate failing public trust in the company. MOX has already been met with strong public protest over the last year. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission also cites concerns about the quality and safety of the fuel, which would be fabricated in Russia where regulation and oversight have been problematic.
Questions about the future of the energy industry, given deregulation and the expense of plutonium fuel compared to uranium fuel, have increased the reluctance of OPG to commit to MOX. Canadian lawmakers are also ill at ease with the idea -- Canada is one of only three G-7 countries that have not responded to US requests to help fund the Russian MOX program.
C. Contractor Limbo
For the third time since December, the Dept. of Energy announced a delay in the release of a draft "Request for Proposals"
(RFP) for contractors interested in bidding on Russian MOX work. The probable cause of the delay is unresolved liability
issues for contractors engaged in plutonium fuel work in Russia. DOE has apparently given up on a timely resolution of
the problem, saying it "cannot establish a revised [RFP] release date with any degree of certainty," and that until a
"realistic" release date can be determined, no RFP will be forthcoming.
D. MOX Fabrication Plant on Hold
A cornerstone of US attempts to secure funding for the Russian MOX program has been to assume a new MOX fabrication plant would not have to be built from scratch in Russia, but instead could be imported from Germany.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the German nuclear corporation Siemens was constructing a MOX fabrication plant at Hanau, but it failed to obtain a license and the project was abandoned in 1995 with construction 90% complete.
The US is pushing for a bargain basement deal on the plant to help keep Russian MOX costs down, but Siemens isn't ready to lose its nearly (US)$400 million investment in the facility. Further, Siemens wants more assurance that it will have no liability for the plant once it is in Russia
(Thanks to Tom Clements of Nuclear Control Institute for items B, C, and D in this section.)
A. MOX Plant Licensing
MOX contractor Duke-Cogema-Stone & Webster (DCS) is expected to submit its application for a MOX plant construction permit around the end of February. As of this writing it has not been submitted.
Submission of the application will trigger public scoping meetings in preparation for the MOX plant Environmental Impact Statement. If the process stays on schedule, those meetings will probably begin in April. Stay tuned - we will need you to submit comments on this document!
In the meantime, nearly 200 individuals and activists around the country submitted a letter demanding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ensure the MOX Plant licensing process include full courtroom proceedings, not simply the "paper-only" process it has thus far chosen that would not allow for cross-examination, in-person expert testimony, discovery, or other basic procedural tools.
The letter was initiated by Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) and the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League. For a copy, contact Glenn Carroll of GANE at atom.girl@mindspring.com.
MORE INFORMATION:
NRC Public meetings:
Timothy C. Johnson
NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
301-415-7299
B. Unresolved Questions
The NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) heard a briefing and discussion from DOE and NRC staff on the proposed MOX fabrication facility in early February at NRC headquarters in Rockville, MD.
Among concerns raised:
- The MOX plant poses some "serious criticality headaches."
- Source of Lead Test Assemblies ("LTAs" - necessary for testing MOX fuel in the McGuire reactor in North Carolina) is still unknown. Described as "one of the primary issues right now" as the Dept. of Energy was going to have them fabricated at the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, but since cancellation of that contract, no new LTA fabricator has been identified. One proposal is to use weapons plutonium from the United Kingdom to fabricate LTAs in France, but this raises numerous transportation and policy concerns.
- Concerns were raised about the fact that ice condenser containment at the McGuire and Catawba reactors (Duke Energy reactors where MOX is slated to be used) is more vulnerable than other containment options, so why were these chosen for MOX?
For a full transcript of the meeting (worth scanning - you can find some good tidbits in here), see: www.nrc.gov/ACRS/rrs1/Trans_Let/index_top/ACRS_transcripts/ac010202.
Use the "find" function on your browser to locate key sections (i.e., scan for the word "criticality" to see the discussion about MOX plant concerns.)
(Thanks to Tom Clements.)
C. Immobilization Takes a Back Seat - Again
On Feb. 12 the DOE announced it is canceling a workshop on immobilization that was to be held in April in Augusta GA. The workshop was to bring together world experts on plutonium management to share technological developments on immobilization options.
The DOE canceled the workshop because of "the transition to a new administration and the press of business." (Perhaps MOX plans are simply immune to distractions of "the press of business?") DOE said it hopes to hold an immobilization workshop in the future, but made no commitment to doing so.
See: www.pnl.gov/conf/index.htm
A. Savannah River Site News
- Leaking Tanks, Hidden Waste
=> Leaking Tanks:
In early February the Augusta Chronicle reported that a high level waste tank at the DOE's Savannah River Site (where the MOX program is slated to take place) had leaked 90 gallons of waste -- a problem which had been detected by DOE nearly a month earlier.
The leak spilled into a saucer-like steel container situated under the 750,000 tank. Both the container and the tank are encased in concrete, and, according to DOE, no waste leaked into the environment.
The 90 gallons of released waste were treated with a ventilator to evaporate the liquid and robots were used to detect the source of the leak. DOE says that anti-corrosion chemicals in the tank will seal the leak. SRS has 51 high level waste tanks, nine of which have leaked over the years. The leak occurred in Tank 6.
SRS will depend on tanks such as these to store waste generated by the MOX fabrication process. Last month it was revealed that the MOX plant will generate 1.6 million gallons of "liquid high alpha activity waste" (plutonium and americium are examples of radionuclides that emit alpha radiation and which could be expected to be found in this waste), which has never before been managed at SRS. Though the MOX contractor, DCS, says the waste will be pretreated in "new tankage" prior to disposal in the tanks, no details have yet emerged about how SRS will manage this new waste stream with an aging tank farm already short on space.
=> Hidden Waste
In early February, MOX contractor DCS reported that the DOE "may have" detected contamination in groundwater adjacent to the site of the proposed MOX fabrication facility in excess of Environmental Protection Agency drinking water limits. An announcement from the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards did not indicate the nature of the contamination, but said that if future testing shows elevated concentrations of contaminants in the groundwater, the Environmental Report submitted by DCS earlier this year would have to be amended.
In light of such discoveries it is important to note that as it prepares an Environmental Impact Statement for the MOX Fabrication Facility, the NRC plans to use as much information from DOE's previous EIS on plutonium disposition as possible, rather than rely on the collection of new data.
(Thanks to Tom Clements and Glenn Carroll of Georgians Against Nuclear Energy)
- Useless Shipments
In early March, SRS is expected to begin to ship plutonium-contaminated waste from on-site in South Carolina to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico for burial 2,100 feet below ground.
The waste transports are part of a plan to send 4,300 shipments of such waste (called "transuranic waste") from four sites east of the Mississippi River to WIPP. However, as the waste is currently stored relatively safely where it is, the shipments are not necessary, though DOE refers to the shipments as a major cleanup milestone. Of much greater concern is the vast amount of plutonium-contaminated buried waste which poses a far more ominous threat to groundwater. SRS anticipates eight to twelve shipments to WIPP by next January.
(Thanks to Bob Schaeffer of Public Policy Communications)
B. In the DOE: Plutonium at Risk
A contractor handling security services for DOE, Reta Security Inc., sent a letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in early February alleging the DOE was not taking appropriate action to ensure the safety of "special nuclear materials," including plutonium.
The letter cited:
- A classified report by the DOE Inspector General showing "clear evidence of actual risk" to special nuclear materials at DOE sites and in transit.
- The need for "massive improvements in [weapons] lab physical security.
- A situation where "the security of the nation's inventory is not only in question, but the security cannot
be assured by any objective measurement."
- A key reason for the problems as the "sometimes bitter" differences between DOE contractors and DOE officials.
Security will be an extremely high priority in the MOX program, as it involves weapons plutonium, including shipping that plutonium in fresh MOX fuel to commercial reactor sites that lack security systems found at weapons facilities. Department-contractor differences could be especially problematic in a program that will be run primarily by a newly formed contractor, Duke-Cogema Stone & Webster (DCS).
(Thanks to Kathy Crandall of Alliance for Nuclear Accountability.)
A. Great Britain 
- Sellafield Struggles
The announcement by Fukushima Governor Eisaku Sato that MOX use is "impossible" for the foreseeable future in his prefecture (see Section I. A. above) has certainly damaged prospects for plutonium fuel in Japan, but could also dash the hopes of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) to finally operate its MOX facility at Sellafield. (BNFL, a MOX fabricator, unsuccessfully bid on the US MOX project, but still has many contracts with DOE across the US weapons complex.)
Last month, BNFL submitted a revised economic analysis for the plant, hoping it would increase the chance that the Secretary of the Environment would finally announce authorization for the plant to operate. But with its main customer wavering on MOX use, BNFL's economic case for MOX appears to be weakening.
Other problems for Sellafield in the last month:
- in early Feb. BNFL was prosecuted for breaching safety regulations in the handling of sealed radioactive sources (used to calibrate radiation detection equipment)
- disaster was narrowly averted when workers ignored an alarm bell indicating a dangerous build-up of explosive hydrogen gas in one of Sellafield's high-level waste tanks. The alarm had been sounding for three hours.
- Only 3 of 28 recommendations by the UK Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) have been addressed at the Sellafield site and more delays were recently announced. The recommendations were placed on BNFL after a string of safety and management scandals last year.
BNFL has also come under fire for its role in transporting MOX fuel from Belgium to Japan through the South Pacific in the armed gunboats the Pacific Pintain and the Pacific Teal. Opposition is especially fierce in New Zealand. In one protest, a small flotilla of yachts is planning on approaching the ships and unfurling anti-nuclear banners in opposition to the plutonium fuel shipment.
(Thanks to Pete Roche and David Lowry.)
- BNFL Looks for Cogema Contracts
BNFL is looking to steal a few choice contracts from its European MOX rival Cogema, the French nuclear corporation that won the US MOX contract for plutonium disposition (it is a member of the Duke-Cogema-Stone & Webster, or DCS, MOX consortium).
Cogema has, until now, been the exclusive provider of reprocessing, reactor maintenance and fuel supply services to Electricite de France (EdF), the primary nuclear utility in France. But EdF is now considering opening those contracts to outside bidding which could be very good news for the troubled BNFL.
Still, the earliest BNFL could provide services to EdF is after 2005 -- perhaps too late for it to add EdF contracts to its economic case for Sellafield.
(Thanks to Steve Dolley of Nuclear Control Institute.)
B. Russia 
- Waste Import Battle - the MOX Connection
A vote by the Russian State Duma to amend environmental laws to allow the import of some 20,000 metric tons of nuclear waste has been delayed until March 22nd. Minatom has proposed storing or reprocessing nuclear waste from other countries in order to generate revenue. Environmentalists point out that Russia has significant problems managing the waste it already has. Recent reports also show that Russia's rail and road infrastructure are weak and poorly maintained and will increase the chances of a transportation accident.
More importantly, the fuel import plan could bolster Russia's long-term MOX plans. With an infusion of western money and technology, the capacity to reprocess spent fuel, thus creating more plutonium, and a MOX plant to fabricate the plutonium into new fuel, Minatom (the Russian atomic ministry) will be well-positioned to create a so-called "plutonium economy" without having to spend much of its own money. Minatom has already said it will separate the weapons plutonium from the MOX fuel at the end of the disposition program, so its intentions are already clear.
<><><> Russian nuclear activists need your help! <><><>
Russian activists have prepared a letter (in Russian and English) to be faxed to key Russian decision-makers to help illustrate global opposition to this radioactive dumping plan. For a copy of the letter and fax numbers, etc., see: www.wand.org/issuesact/moxbbdart1_02-01.html. (Letter can be downloaded in Word format.) Proponents are hoping that opposition to the fuel import plan will die down before the March 22nd vote. Let's show them otherwise!
RELATED NEWS:
(Thanks to Vladimir Sliviak of ECODEFENSE!, Olga Pinstunova of the Anti-Nuclear Resistance Campaign, and Don Moniak of Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League.)
- Problems at Proposed MOX Reactor
Unit #2 at the Balakovo nuclear power station in Saratov experienced a "technical failure" in mid-February,
which Minatom said resulted in no radioactivity leaks. All four units at the Balakovo power station (which are
the Soviet VVER-1000 design) are slated to use MOX fuel. No additional information is available about the incident as of this writing.
A. Reports and Resources 
-
Plutonium: The Last Five Years
Report by Don Moniak of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League
Documents plutonium inventories, hazards, and DOE mismanagement.
http://bredl.org/press/2001/Pu_Report.htm
- Nuclear Alchemy Gamble
Report by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
Assessment of transmutation as a waste management strategy. (Transmutation requires reprocessing, which results in increased stocks of separated plutonium.)
www.ieer.org/reports/transm/summary.html
- US Congressional Committee Lists and Schedules
Save this list!
(Thanks to Jim Bridgman of Alliance for Nuclear Accountability)
- DOE Occurrence Reports
Want to stay on top of all the latest news around the DOE weapons complex?
From tank leaks to equipment failures to contamination, this site has it all.
See the Publicly Accessible Occurrence Database at:
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/oeaf/orps.html
The list of databases is cryptic and confusing - in the drop-down menu of databases, try the following for some of the more well-known DOE facilities:
- ORO--BJC-PGDPENVRES-2000-0020
- RFO--KHLL-WSTMGTOPS-2000-0040
- RL--PHMC-SOLIDWASTE-2000-0009
- SR--WSRC-HCAN-2000-0055
- ALO--WWID-WIPP-2000-0004
- "Insights from Offsite"
Don Moniak, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League Aiken, SC Office
Periodic email bulletin on issues related to the Savannah River Site and plutonium policies and management.
To receive a copy contact <donmoniak@earthlink.net.
B. Articles
-
"Moscow Seeks Nuclear Power's Holy Grail"
St. Petersburg Times
Excellent story on Minatom's plutonium plans and how MOX fits in
www.sptimes.ru/archive/times/640/top/t_1767.htm
- "The Children of Chernobyl"
Joan King, Atlanta WAND, Georgia 20/20
Column in The Gainsville Times 2/21/01
Excerpt:
"It is no longer possible to say that what happened at a power plant half way round the globe - that what is happening now in labs and universities and government offices around the world - is not our responsibility. We have become a corporate world. We must learn to bear corporate responsibility. Plutonium was only the first of the new elements, but it lies at the heart of the dilemma. It is toxic. It is radioactive, and it will be around virtually forever. It is the essential ingredient in todayıs thermonuclear bombs, and it is the byproduct of every nuclear power plant everywhere in the world.'
Full article:
www.wand.org/issuesact/moxbbdart2_02-01.html
C. Announcements
- WAND Job Opening: Nuclear Policy Associate
Women's Action for New Directions (WAND) is hiring a staff person to work on nuclear policy and advocacy issues from our Washington DC office. Responsibilities include both Hill and grassroots work on a range of nuclear issues, including MOX.
Full job description and application information:
www.wand.org/abtwand/employ/nuclear.html
- Greenpeace: Disarmament Campaign Coordinator
The Disarmament Campaign Coordinator is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Greenpeace USA disarmament campaign including leading the planning and implementation of activities surrounding the campaign and being responsible for managing and developing the campaigner staff.
More information:
www.greenpeaceusa.org/inside/jobs/disarmcamptext.htm
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The MOX BULLETIN BOARD is compiled by Women's
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