A. People's Hearings / MOX Conference in Russia

In late May and early June a delegation of US anti-MOX activists sponsored by the Center for Safe Energy (CSE) traveled to Russia to participate in a series of "people's hearings "on the use of plutonium fuel in Russian light water and breeder reactors. The tour was modeled after people's hearings held in the US in 1998.

The hearings took place in cities that could be directly impacted by MOX:

• Saratov, on the Volga River downstream from the Balakova Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), where all four VVER-1000 reactors are slated to burn MOX (the hearings were actually in the town of Balakova itself, but other meetings took place in Saratov);

• Rostov, on the Don River downstream from the nearly-completed NPP in Volgadonsk which has been suggested for MOX in the past; and

• Ekaterinberg, in the southern Ural mountains near the Beloyarskaya NPP where the BN-600 breeder reactor is located -- a key part of Russian MOX plans.

The hearings provided an opportunity for communities that will be most impacted by the MOX program to receive information on the health and safety effects of the fabrication and use of plutonium fuel. The government has done little in the way of public education and there has been virtually no opportunity for public input on the plan.

Attendees were overwhelmingly opposed to MOX, with most concerns centered on reactor safety and the threat of new environmental contamination in areas already heavily impacted by the nuclear industry. A formal position statement on MOX was generated after each hearing and plans are to translate each into English for distribution outside of Russia.

For a more detailed report, see www.wand.org/issuesact/moxbbdart1_6-30.html. An additional report by the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League can be found at www.bredl.org.

Krasnoyarsk Conference
The hearings were followed by an international conference on MOX in Krasnoyarsk which included technical and policy presentations on MOX and plutonium, and concluded with a joint letter addressed to G-8 Heads of State opposing efforts to secure funding for the Russian MOX program (see below).

For an article on the Krasnoyarsk conference by Dr. David Lowry, UK environmental research consultant, see www.wand.org/issuesact/moxbbdart2_6-30.html. For a copy of the G-8 letter or to sign on, contact the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, bredl@skybest.com.

Additional Note:
Leonid Piskunov, an long-time leader of local environmental efforts and a scientist who has conducted very important work documenting radiation contamination in the Chelyabinsk region, passed away a short time after the hearings in Ekaterinberg (June 2), which he organized and chaired. Our sympathies go out to those who knew and worked with Dr. Piskunov -- his passing is a great loss.

B. Activists Present an Alternative

On June 1st, immediately before the Clinton-Putin summit, the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) released an "Alternative Plutonium Disposition Plan" signed by over 150 organizations worldwide calling for a halt to MOX plans in the US and Russia. IEER's Moscow press conference was attended by several local TV stations and other members of the press, but was ignored by the US Dept. of Energy and Minatom whose MOX-intensive disposition plan was announced several days later at the summit. For a copy of the letter (which now has over 200 signers), see http://www.ieer.org/comments/pu-disp/moxsrp.html.

C. G-8 in Okinawa: MOX Motherlode?

If an international assortment of anti-MOX activists have their way, US representatives will fail in their attempts to secure funding for the Russian MOX program at the G-8 meeting in Okinawa July 21-23.

A joint letter to G-8 Heads of State pointing out the many problems with MOX and calling on them to fund alternative technologies was drafted at the Krasnoyarsk conference in Russia in June and will be presented - in person, if possible - to G-8 delegates in late July. As of this writing, the letter has about 35 signatories from four countries but more are being sought.

To sign on or to find out more, contact Lou Zeller at the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, email: bredl@skybest.com, phone: 336-982-2691, web: www.bredl.org.

D. Another Chance to Speak Out!

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the agency that will license the MOX fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site as well as the reactors that plan to use MOX fuel, is holding two public meetings in the southeast in July to present information on licensing the MOX Fabrication Facility.

Meeting #1: Columbia, SC
7:00 p.m. Wed. July 12
Campus Room, U of SC Capstone Conference Center
900 Barnwell St.
Directions: 803-777-6636

Meeting #2: North Augusta, SC
7:00 p.m. Thurs., July 13
North Augusta Community Center
495 Brookside Drive
Directions: 803-441-4290

WHY WE NEED YOU:
The licensing process is one of the most effective ways the public can intervene to stop MOX. Your attendance will help show that people throughout the southeast are impacted by SRS and have grave concerns about plutonium transportation, processing, handling, and use.

In addition, in May, the NRC held one barely-publicized meeting in Washington DC on the draft Standard Review Plan for the MOX plant. These meetings in South Carolina are a result of activists' complaints that public meetings MUST be held in directly-impacted communities. It's a small victory, but it demonstrates that if we raise our voices, we can be heard!

Information, talking points, and networking: Mary Fox Olson, Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), 706-722-8968 or nirs.se@mindspring.com.

E. International Nix MOX Day 2000

The Third Annual International Nix MOX Day will take place Thursday, September 28th.

(Note: The date was suggested by several Russian activists as it coincides with the Sept. 29th anniversary of the catastrophic 1957 Kyshtym accident in Russia, when a high-level nuclear waste tank exploded causing extensive contamination in downwind communities.)

Planning is just getting underway - now is the time to think about how your community might participate!

In the past this day has included anti-MOX actions across the globe, such as a joint international statement opposing MOX, regional/local direct actions, media events, and more. For a sample of past events, contact Pat Ortmeyer port@bigsky.net or Kevin Kamps kevin@igc.org.

Mark your calendar -- with the recent signing of the US-Russian agreement, it is more important than ever to raise our voices around the world to say No to MOX!

A. BNFL: Again

British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. (BNFL), the multinational nuclear corporation that has been plagued with safety and management problems related to its MOX fabrication and fuel reprocessing activities, continues to struggle as its core operations remain under fire. (For background information on BNFL, see previous Nix MOX Bulletins at www.wand.org/issuesact.nixmox-index.html.)

Recent news:

• In late May, BNFL's dismal management record was cited as evidence by the UK Commons Select Committee on Trade that the British government was not exerting enough control over the state-owned corporation. As a result of BNFL's misguided management path, the future of its reprocessing activities is being seriously questioned as is the possibility of opening a new £400m MOX fabrication facility at Sellafield. The company also planned on privatizing up to 49% of its holdings, but in the wake of recent data falsification scandals, the deal is on hold until at least 2002. On June 29 in a move to get privatization plans back on track, BNFL hired a new finance officer, John Edwards.

• Also in May, the European Union environment commissioner, Margot Wallström, strongly condemned BNFL's falsification of quality control data, partly blaming the UK government for poor oversight of the company. Meanwhile, Ireland and several Nordic countries continued to increase international pressure for the closure of Sellafield, BNFL's reprocessing faclility (see note below on OSPAR meeting). Sellafield discharges around eight million liters of nuclear waste per day into the Irish Sea.

• The London Telegraph reported on May 28th that BNFL faced bankruptcy after discovering £9 billion in debts in its accounts. BNFL refuted the claim, saying that until its liability review is complete (due in September), such a claim could not be made. That same week, BNFL announced it will be leaving the nuclear power generation business, closing its eight Magnox power stations by 2021.

• On June 2nd, BNFL was fined £40,000 and £34,000 in costs for its sixth breach of health and safety at its Sellafield plant in the past 10 years. BNFL's failure to install safety procedures four years ago led to a leak of 1,500 gallons of acid which injured two workers in March 1999, thus bringing the safety lapses to light.

• In early June, Germany announced a nuclear power phase-out plan that will essentially eliminate its long-term reprocessing contracts with BNFL (though actual phase-out still faces many hurdles).

• Also in early June, Japan repeated its demand that BNFL take back the MOX fuel it delivered last fall in light of the data falsification scandal. (Japan has banned MOX shipments from BNFL and was formerly BNFL's biggest customer.)

• The Independent reported on June 20 that a Sellafield worker sabotaged the manufacture of MOX fuel by welding debris alongside the fuel in the hollow fuel rods. The debris was detected by x-ray, but had it not been, could have caused extremely serious safety problems. Investigators believe the sabotage was carried out to divert attention from the investigation into the data falsification scandal.

• The June OSPAR convention in Copenhagen passed a decision on radioactive discharges into the sea that stopped just short of calling for a halt to European reprocessing (which would affect both BNFL and Cogema), as had been proposed by Ireland and Denmark. The final decision called for a review of reprocessing "as a matter of priority," giving consideration instead to dry storage of radioactive waste. Five of the countries that supported a total ban on reprocessing were customers of BNFL. (Note: The 1992 OSPAR Convention requires the prevention and elimination of marine pollution in the North-East Atlantic region, including the Irish Sea. "OSPAR" is derived from the names of the Oslo and Paris Conventions (1972 and 1974, respectively).)

Meanwhile, in a harshly criticized move, the British government announced it will not meet the 2020 deadline it agreed to at the 1998 OSPAR meeting to eliminate radioactive discharges from Sellafield into the Irish Sea.

More on the OSPAR decision: www.greenpeace.org/%7Enuclear/ospar2000/index.html.

(Thanks to David Lowry and Pete Roche of Greenpeace UK for this information.)

B. Cogema News

(Note: Cogema is the French nuclear corporation that has the primary contract for MOX work in the US.)

• In late May Cogema bid on the nuclear clean-up project at the Hanford nuclear facility in Washington state from which BNFL had been fired just one month before, illustrating an increasing level of competition for US contracts between Europe's two giant MOX fabricators.

• In early June, Cogema announced the creation of its partnership with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO) and intent to bid on the US plutonium immobilization project.

• Cogema has submitted a request to increase its production capacity at its La Hague plant in France, though it will most certainly lead to more environmental contamination. Greenpeace and others are protesting the expansion plan.

• A report by World Information Service on Energy - Paris (WISE-Paris), shows that due to its ongoing reprocessing activities, Cogema's plutonium stockpiles continue to grow. See www.wise-paris.org/ourgraph/contentframe/contentpuindustry.html for more information.

• On June 5, Cogema threatened to take legal action against a Greenpeace ship which is documenting radiation releases from a discharge pipe at the La Hague facility using live video images transmitted over the Internet, including to a large screen set up at the OSPAR meeting. To see the webcam images go to: www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear/ospar2000/livecamconf.html.

• Greenpeace had also placed an "OSPAR" device on the end of Cogema's discharge pipe ("Object to Stop Pollution from Accumulation of Radioactivity") that divided discharges from the pipe into six streams - one for each of Cogema's client countries. (Cogema has since removed the device.) La Hague discharges about 500 million liters of nuclear waste into the English Channel each year through the discharge pipe.

• On June 25 Greenpeace released a poll showing that eight of ten people living in European countries with reprocessing contracts at La Hague or Sellafield oppose radioactive dumping in the sea. The greatest opposition was among German citizens (94% opposed), but residents of France and Great Britain, where these reprocessing facilities are located, also showed strong opposition: 80% and 85% opposed, respectively. More information: www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear, click on "Press Releases," then "June 25, 2000."

(Thanks to Mycle Schneider of WISE-Paris, Tom Clements of Nuclear Control Institute, Susan Gordon of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, and Pete Roche for this information.)

C. Updates from Russia

1. French-Russian-German Cooperation on MOX

   Laurent Corbier, US-Russia business director for Cogema's nuclear fuel and recycling branch, told a conference in St. Petersburg in mid June that a joint Russian-French-German working group had confirmed "preliminary" investment costs of $800 million for construction of MOX-related facilities in Russia. Some of this construction could use equipment from a German MOX plant that was built but never operated, pending approval by the German government to allow the transfer of the equipment.

   Corbier estimated construction of fabrication facilities by 2007 or 2008 with operation beginning in 2009 at a plutonium disposition rate of 2 metric tons per year. Facilities would include a plutonium conversion module called "Chemox;" and a fuel fabrication module called "Demox," using Cogema's "A-Mimas" process to fabricate fuel for VVER-1000 reactors, and the "Coca" process for MOX fuel for the BN-600 breeder reactor.

   US estimates of the entire Russian MOX program are about $1.7 billion, but actually costs will almost certainly be much higher. (See below for more on this cost study.)

2. Report on VVER-1000 Safety

   On June 26, ECODEFENSE! and the Anti-nuclear Campaign of the Socio-Ecological Union announced the release of a new report on the consequences of the use of MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. Among the findings: an accident at a VVER-1000 reactor using MOX fuel would release 2.5 to 3 times more radiation than if it were using conventional uranium fuel.

   The report also analyzes technical aspects of Russian light-water reactors at Balakova, Kalinin, Kola, and Novovoronezh, provides information on accidents over the last 10 years, and examines economic impacts of MOX fuel use.

   To order a copy (in Russian) contact ECODEFENSE! at ecodefense@glasnet.ru. An English translation may be available in the near future.

3. Expansion of Nuclear Power / Import of Nuclear Waste

   On May 25 Minister of Atomic Energy Evgeny Adamov announced an ambitious plan to build or complete construction on 38 new reactors in Russia by 2020 and optimistically predicted that a "closed fuel cycle" would solve the issue of the additional nuclear waste that would be generated by this plan.

   Not only does his plan more than double the number of currently operating reactors, it comes with the promise of continued reprocessing and the import of waste from other countries, a proposal strongly opposed by the Russian public.

   In a Sept. 1999 speech to the Uranium Institute (see www.uilondon.org/sym/1999/adamov.htm) Adamov claimed that even if nuclear power were expanded, it would be possible to do so without increasing the level of radioactivity in the environment by "achieving a balance between the radioactivity of the waste being buried and of the uranium extracted from the earth."

   Currently, Russian law prohibits the import of nuclear waste, but activists fear the government has already approved Adamov's plan in principle and the legal barriers to the spent fuel import proposal will soon be lost. (See related story under #5 below.)

4. NGO Opposition to New Reactors

   For a transcript of a BBC story on NGO opposition to nuclear reactor expansion plans at the Novovoronezh atomic power station, see www.wand.org/issuesact/moxbbdart3_6-30.html.

5. Anti-Nuclear Activists Arrested

   Seven anti-nuclear activists, including Natalya Mironova and Andrey Talevlin of the Movement for Nuclear Safety, were arrested June 29 in Chelyabinsk for protesting a proposal to allow commercial reprocessing at the Mayak facility, according to an email received by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER). Police said the protesters would be held for two hours, but a regional official said they will be detained for 24 hours. Updates will be posted by IEER as they are received.

6. Invitation for Cooperative Work
   (Message from Nadejda L.Kutepova, excerpted from recent email.)

   Dear friends!

   In September 1999 the Agency Information Cooperation (AIC) was created in the Ural-Siberian region in Russia. The creation of the network of the AIC was conditioned by the necessity to unite efforts of ecological and law NGOs around the most burning topic of the day of this region - the import and storage of foreign nuclear waste in Russia.

   The aim of the creation of the AIC has became the exchange of information on ecological and social problems as well as studying public opinion and its influence on these problems. We have common or similar problems and we must find the ways to solve them together.

   If you would like to cooperate with us, will you write us a letter, please. I hope we'll succeed in exchanging all kinds of information. We are ready to help you and are looking forward to receiving messages from you.

   Best regards,

   Nadejda L.Kutepova, Main Coordinator
   South Ural, Russia
   Ozersk, Chelybinsk region
   Address: p\b 377 Ozersk
   Russia 456780
   phone: (35171) 41686
   e-mail: nadya@nadya.chel-65.chel.su
   

(Thanks to Vladimir Slivyak of ECODEFENSE! and the Anti-nuclear Campaign of the Socio-Ecological Union, Nadejda L.Kutepova of AIC, Nix MOX Bulletin Board Russian translator Natasha Akulenko, and Tom Clements of NCI for this information.)

A. US-Russian Agreement

The long-anticipated US-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition was announced during the Clinton-Putin summit in early June, though it still remains to be signed. The agreement calls for the disposition of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium by each country, with MOX being chosen as the disposition technology for the vast majority of that material. In fact, though Russia was originally going to immobilize one metric ton of its plutonium, in the 11th hour this provision was dropped and Russia will use MOX for all 34 metric tons surplus weapons plutonium. As a result, no immobilization technology will be developed in Russia in the foreseeable future.

Despite the announced plan, the Russian program remains to be funded, and the US will approach potential international donors at the July 21-23 G-8 meeting in Okinawa. Money is not likely to be forthcoming, however, based on trade press interviews with G-8 representatives over the last month.

The program is estimated to cost $1.7 billion, though this is undoubtedly a low estimate (see cost study information below), and the US has already contributed $200 million. Laura Holgate, Director of DOE's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, reported in March that there is another $200 million that could be requested between 2000 and 2004 out of the Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative. This still leaves the program far short of its goal, however.

Of note:
In the bilateral agreement, Russia is excused from its obligation to dispose of surplus plutonium if money cannot be found to proceed with disposition. Subsequently, at the Moscow press briefing about the announcement of the plutonium agreement, a senior administration official stated "And if there is no disposition in Russia, there would probably not be disposition in the United States."

"Expansion Plan"
An "expansion" plan is envisioned to be put in place one year from the signing of the agreement which could call for a doubling of the plutonium disposition rate in each country (from two metric tons of plutonium per year to four). Achieving this rate is of particular concern in Russia where even the two metric ton per year rate stretches existing disposition capacity.

Possibilities for expansion include using reactors outside of Russia, increasing the MOX load in VVER-1000s, development of the High Temperature Gas Reactor, or altering the burn-up rate to allow more MOX fuel to be irradiated in a shorter time.

More information:

• White House press release and related documents: www.whitehouse.gov
• Russian NGO statement on agreement: www.bellona.no/imaker?id=17024&sub=1
• Article: "Unintended Consequences: The Moscow Plutonium Deal" www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/060900.ASP

B. Russian Parallex Shipment

Exact dates are not known, but the shipment of test MOX fuel from Russia to Canada as part of the US-Russian Parallex Project is likely to take place at the end of June and may be flown along the entire route.

On June 28, citizen action groups and several Indian tribes filed a lawsuit "over the unlawful manner in which [the Canadian government] is importing weapons-plutonium MOX fuel into Canada," aiming to increase public knowledge of and ability to comment on issues of plutonium transport. (In January, a similar shipment from the US Los Alamos Lab in New Mexico was made in secret in the middle of the night following months of vocal opposition by environmental groups, citizens, Indian tribes and others against the shipment.)

Also, in late May the Montreal Urban Community environment committee adopted a resolution calling on the Canadian government to "put an end to the project of eliminating military plutonium" due to health and environmental concerns. According to local organizers, 155 municipalities in Quebec have passed resolutions calling on the government to cease its plutonium import program.

(Thanks to Kay Cumbow of Citizens for a Healthy Planet for this information.)

C. Russian MOX Cost Study

In April, the Joint US-Russian Working Group released a report on the costs of the Russian plutonium disposition program, estimating $1.7 billion in costs over 20 years. The report cautions that these are preliminary estimates using assumptions that most likely will change as the program moves forward. However, the figure has been cited in documents on the plutonium agreement recently released by the White House.

The $1.7 billion figure is all but guaranteed to be far below actual costs, and is actually described only as a "base case." Numerous items are excluded from this estimate, such as: monitoring and inspections to ensure compliance with agreements; provisions for material protection control and accounting; decontamination and decommissioning; waste disposal (burial), payment for contingencies, and possible use of High Temperature Gas Reactors for disposition (including costs for research, development and use).

Other items from the report:

• six reactors will be used in Russia for plutonium disposition: four VVER-1000 light-water reactors in Balakova, the BN-600 breeder reactor in Beloyarskaya, and the BOR-60 experimental reactor in Dimitrovgrad.

• the BN-600 is estimated to disposition 15.048 metric tons (MT) of plutonium, the VVER-1000s 21.446 MT, and the BOR-60 0.45 MT. (Total = 36.944 MT). This amount is greater than the 34 metric tons announced in the US-Russian agreement because up to 12% "blend stock" would be added to the plutonium to mask the military characteristics of the surplus plutonium to be dispositioned.

• MOX fuel would be fabricated in four places: Dimitrovgrad (VVER-1000 test assemblies, Vibropac fuel for the BOR-60 reactor, and BN-600 Vibropac partial core fuel); Mayak Paket facility (for BN-600 pelletized partial core fuel); Krasnoyarsk (for full core pellatized BN-600 fuel); and Novosibirsk (VVER-1000 fuel assemblies).

• it is estimated that $52 million will be spent on modifications of the VVER-1000s, $73.6 million on the BN-600, and $100 million on the BOR-60.

• it is assumed that a 40% MOX core in VVER-1000 reactors will be achieved "over time."

• licenses will be required to construct or modify the following facilities: VVER-1000 reactors, BN-600 reactor, plutonium conversion facility, MOX fabrication plant, pilot fuel fabrication facilities, spent fuel, storage and waste facilities, cask and transport vehicle design and movement of the material between sites.

• plutonium conversion to oxide form will begin in a demonstration plant with a capacity of 1.6 MTs (cost: $33.3 million), followed by an industrial plant with a capacity of 34.8 MT (cost: $252 million) and will use an aqueous process.

• one-third of the estimated costs of the Russian program would be incurred between 2001 and 2006 because of the "ambitious design and construction schedule." Annual operating costs between 2007 and 2019 would average $90 million.

The Cost Working Group will continue with more studies to "extend and deepen" the analysis in the April report and also include items not covered here. For a copy of the April report (in PDF format), see: http://twilight.saic.com/md/ru_docs.asp.

A. Racial Discrimination Lawsuit

A federal judged denied class action status to African American plaintiffs in a case against SRS alleging racial discrimination in job placement and that black employees were placed in and forced to remain in higher-risk jobs at the plant. US District Judge Cameron M. Currie announced the decision on May 26. The decision means that each of the 99 plaintiffs in the suit must instead have their cases heard individually.

On June 12, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the ruling conflicts with US Supreme Court decisions allowing class action status on the basis of subjectivity and that the judge failed to consider flaws in SRS personnel policies.

More information and articles: http://augustachronicle.com/stories/061400/met_066-4955.000.shtml.

(Thanks to Employees United Legal Defense Fund for this information.)

B. Plutonium Transport Container Problems

As a result of failing a recent 30-foot drop test, 35-gallon drum "9975" shipping containers which were to be used for the transport of plutonium to SRS must be redesigned at a cost of $1.8 billion. The Dept. of Energy says this will not delay planned plutonium shipments for this fall, though it admitted that its primary SRS contractor, Westinghouse Savannah River Site, failed to put in place an acceptable framework for testing the design of the container. A Westinghouse spokesman commented that this time "we're confident that we will get that job done well." See: www.augustachronicle.com/stories/061100/tec_066-4931.000.shtml.

C. One HEPA Trouble

One unresolved issue in the design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility slated for SRS is what type of filter should be used to prevent radiation releases in case of an accident. While sand filters are more expensive, they are considered by the Safety Board to provide better protection than HEPA (High Energy Particulate Air) filters, particularly in case of fire, as HEPA filters can become saturated by sprinkler systems, seriously compromising their performance. DOE is leaning toward the less expensive HEPA filter option, though many questions remain about its performance.

For some excellent background information on HEPA filters and the problems with them as well as how to apply this information to the fight against MOX, contact Dr. Peter Rickards at nifty@cyberhighway.net, 2672 East 4000 North, Twin Falls , Idaho, 83301.

D. SRS Security Lapses

SRS was fined $1 million for allowing computers with hard drives and floppy disks still in them to be sold and shipped to China. SRS contractors claim the computers claimed no classified information, though there were no records to prove so. See news story at: www.thestate.com/local/docs/srsf.htm.

E. Health Study to Include SRS

A study by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health will examine worker health records at several DOE weapons facilities, including SRS, to determine whether long-term exposure to low levels of radiation cause lung cancer. See news story at: www.thestate.com/headlines/regiondocs/21radiation.htm.

(Thanks to Sara Barczak of Campaign for a Prosperous Georgia for the two preceding announcements.)

F. More Tritium to be Dumped in Savannah River

SRS plans on increasing the amount of tritium being dumped in the Savannah River due to new waste treatment projects and technologies at the site. DOE officials are quick to add that the higher levels are below federal drinking water standards. (The standard allows 20,000 picocuries of tritium per liter of water - the new releases "should not exceed" 5,000 picocuries per liter. A picocurie is a billionth of a curie.) Current tritium standards, however, are set to ensure a "safe" dose to a 160 lb. male, rather than women, children, or fetuses who may be far more vulnerable to tritium exposure. More information: port@bigsky.net.

A. Web Resources

1. ISIS Plutonium Conference Documents
   Transcripts from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) conference, "Separated Plutonium Stocks - Planning for the Future," are now available online, including remarks by DOE Office of Fissile Material Disposition Director Laura Holgate. See www.isis-online.org and go to "Proceedings of the March 2000 Conference."

2. Computer simulation of radioactive discharges from BNFL's Sellafield reprocessing plant and Cogema's La Haugue reprocessing plant: www.greenpeace.org/~nuclear/ospar2000/html/content/ospar.html. See also the Greenpeace campaign on stopping Sellafield at: www.greenpeace.org.uk.

3. House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee Report on the future of reprocessing in the UK: www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmtrdind/307/30702.htm.

4. Non-proliferation and nuclear waste news updated daily by Nuclear Control Institute: www.nci.org/news-today.htm.

B. Summer Camp for Activists

The Nuclear Free Great Lakes Campaign will hold its Second Annual Activists Action Camp August 20-26. This year's theme: "Organize to End the Nuclear Age!"

The focus of the Camp will be on 1.) teaching energy issues to build a movement to create a sustainable energy future for the Great Lakes Basin, and 2.) developing activist skills in areas such as direct action/non-violence training; media; fundraising, community organizing.

For more information contact Dave Kraft, Director, Nuclear Energy Information Service: phone: 847-869-7650, fax: 847-869-7658, email: neis@forward.net, web: www.neis.org.

SPECIAL NOTE:
Tragically, Laura Bulow, Action Camp co-organizer and dedicated anti-nuclear activist, was killed while riding her bike home on Thursday June 22nd. Our deepest sympathies are extended to her family, friends and colleagues associated with the camp. This year's camp will be dedicated to her memory. For more information contact Dave Kraft (information above).

C. New MOX Resource

Physicians for Social Responsibility: PSR Monitor on MOX is now available. Contact Kimberly Roberts at the PSR national office, kroberts@psr.org, 202-898-0150.

D. Letter to Editor

The Independent, June 24, 2000

Nuclear Pledge

At Foreign Office question time on Tuesday I was delighted that the Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, confirmed that the Government does not support the conversion of surplus plutonium-removed from Russian nuclear warheads-into 'MOX' fuel.

You have reported again ("Sellafield sabotage was intended to divert Mox inquiry," 20 June) the continuing manufacturing problems that have bedeviled BNFL's attempts to make MOX fuel. The Russian plans to convert some 33,000 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium explosives into reactor fuel, when their nuclear industry has suffered so many nuclear mishaps, beggars belief. We have recently heard of a previously unreported near meltdown accident at theBN-600 fast breeder reactor near Yekaterinburg in Russia, the only reactor currently capable of MOX use.

The Foreign Office should make it clear at next month's meeting of the G8 in Okinawa that Britain is prepared to help with radioactive clean-up in Russia, but will not pay towards any misguided MOX plans.

Llew Smith MP (Blaenau Gwent, Labour)
House of Commons, London, SW1