NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
Legislative Response to ABM Withdrawal
Courtesy of Kathy Crandall of Nuclear Disarmament Partnership
email: kcrandall@disarmament.org
Including:
- White House Press Release -Bush Statement on the ABM Treaty
- Rep. Woolsey (D-CA) Resolution,H.RES.313
- Statement excerpts from Senators
- A. Senator Daschle (D-SD Senate Majority Leader)
- B. Senator Levin (D-MI Chair of the Armed Serivices Committee)
- C. Senator Biden (D-DE Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee)
Dec. 13, 2001
Thank you to many of you who I know made urgent phone calls on the ABM Treaty yesterday.
Today the President delivered formal notification of the Administration's intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty in 6 months. (Article XV of the ABM treaty allows for withdrawl under certain circumstances - with a 6 month notification required.)
As Senate Majority Leader Daschle noted, the Congress still has the power of the purse - power to withold funding for activities that would violate the ABM Treaty. We plan to work with Congress in the coming year to insist that they exercise this power, as well as additional Congressional oversight obligations with actions such as Hearings that Chair of the Armed Services Committee Levin promises to have.
Right now is a critical time for Congress to voice its opposition to the President's action. Before Congress adjourns for the year, it should be made clear that the President's unilateral and precipitous withdrawal from the ABM treaty will not be supported by the Congress.
Instead the U.S. needs to take a leadership role in reducing imminent nuclear threats.This means, for example, pursuing real reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals, supporting nonproliferation programs, and supporting the worldwide moratorium on nuclear test explosions. We have had some modest successes this year on some of these issues (stay tuned for a legislative update forthcoming), and will have a number of challenges and opportunities in the coming year as we work with Congress to push forward this agenda.
Some in the Senate have already made statements about the President's actions today-
exerpts from Senators Biden (D-DE Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee),
Levin (D-MI Chair of the Armed Services Committee) and Daschle (D-SD -Senate Majority Leader) are enclosed.
In the House, Rep. Woolsey(D-CA) along with 28 original co-sponsors introduced Resolution H.RES.313 ,:Expressing
the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the continued importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
With the help of many urgent phone calls from arms control / disarmament advocates yesterday,
Woolsey was able to garner these 28 co-sponsors in just a few hours yesterday.(Co-sponsors and text listed below).
ACTION: Please call your Senators and Representatives. Ask them to voice their opposition
to the US Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. House Members should be asked to sign on to the Woolsey's H. Res. 313.
THANK YOU
1) White House Press Release -Bush Statement on the ABM Treaty
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-4.html
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For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary
December 13, 2001
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
The Rose Garden 9:58 A.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: Good morning. I've just concluded a meeting of my National Security Council. We reviewed what I discussed with my friend, President Vladimir Putin, over the course of many meetings, many months. And that is the need for America to move beyond the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile treaty.
Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.
The 1972 ABM treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. And neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.
Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.
We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.
At the same time, the United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation. Beginning in Ljubljana, and continuing in meetings in Genoa, Shanghai, Washington and Crawford, President Putin and I developed common ground for a new strategic relationship. Russia is in the midst of a transition to free markets and democracy. We are committed to forging strong economic ties between Russia and the United States, and new bonds between Russia and our partners in NATO. NATO has made clear its desire to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.
I look forward to visiting Moscow, to continue our discussions, as we seek a formal way to express a new strategic relationship that will last long beyond our individual administrations, providing a foundation for peace for the years to come.
We're already working closely together as the world rallies in the war against terrorism. I appreciate so much President Putin's important advice and cooperation as we fight to dismantle the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. I appreciate his commitment to reduce Russia's offensive nuclear weapons. I reiterate our pledge to reduce our own nuclear arsenal between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.
As President Putin said in Crawford, we are on the path to a fundamentally different relationship. The Cold War is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges.
But this is not a day for looking back. This is a day for looking forward with hope, and anticipation of greater prosperity and peace for Russians, for Americans and for the entire world.
Thank you.
END
2) Woolsey (D-CA) Resolution,H.RES.313
HOUSE RESOLUTION 313
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Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the continued importance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Whereas nuclear weapons remain a threat to humankind;
Whereas the ABM Treaty has been the cornerstone of international arms control efforts since its inception in 1972;
Whereas the ABM Treaty has helped maintain trusting, lasting relationships with traditional allies of the United States and has been the foundation for positive relationships with Russia and other nuclear states;
Whereas the ABM Treaty remains an important means of limiting the threat of nuclear war and the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
Whereas the ABM Treaty is an important symbol of the United States' commitment to global peace and cooperation in order to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and remains an important and viable method for safeguarding international peace;
Whereas the American people have made it overwhelmingly clear that they support a reasoned approach toward arms control policy-which the ABM Treaty represents-and not a buildup of weapons system and programs;
Whereas the ABM Treaty helps ensure that no country questions the validity of the established and proven principles of deterrence, which remains an important and viable method for safeguarding international peace;
Whereas President Bush's November 2001 agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce the number of nuclear weapons held by both countries is a welcome and useful step toward global peace and security;
Whereas we are troubled by the Bush Administration's desire to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to develop and build a National Missile Defense System;
Whereas no National Missile Defense system has proven to be reliable, despite numerous trial tests;
Whereas withdrawing from, or abrogating, the ABM Treaty in order to continue development of a National Missile Defense System could weaken ties with traditional allies of the United States and alienate friendly, non-nuclear countries;
Whereas withdrawing from, or abrogating, the ABM Treaty would destabilize the international relations and could spur nuclear states to pursue a new arms race with the United States;
Whereas deployment of a National Missile Defense system presently outlawed by the ABM Treaty would undermine deterrence, thereby increasing tension between nuclear powers and increasing worldwide instability;
Whereas a National Missile Defense system would also be perceived by other states as a threat and could hinder attempts to further reduce nuclear arsenals;
Whereas increased tension between nuclear powers threatens the stability that makes economic and social cooperation between such powers possible;
Whereas the events of September 11, 2001-and the worldwide response to them-underscore the fact that interstate cooperation is extraordinarily important for protecting the security of United States citizens;
Whereas a National Missile Defense system would not have prevented the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
Whereas terrorist groups or rogue nations are far more likely to use simple means to threaten or harm the United States as opposed to the types of weapons a National Missile Defense system would defend against;
Whereas withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and developing a NMD system would divert scarce taxpayer dollars and attention away from more pressing threats to our national security;
Whereas these scarce resources should be earmarked for homeland security priorities, such as increased airline security, public health measures, and rebuilding those communities affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001:
Now, therefore, be it Resolved, that it is the sense of the House of Representatives that in the interests of United States citizens, and all of humankind, that the United States should--
- remain a signatory to the ABM Treaty;
- not encourage Russia to withdraw in order to validate United States
efforts to build a National Missile Defense system;
- continue to work cooperatively with Russia and other nuclear powers to prevent nuclear proliferation, reduce the number of weapons in current arsenals, and facilitate nuclear disarmament.
COSPONSORS (28), ALPHABETICAL
Rep Baldwin, Tammy - 12/12/2001
Rep Barrett, Thomas M. - 12/12/2001
Rep Blumenauer, Earl - 12/12/2001
Rep DeFazio, Peter A. - 12/12/2001
Rep Doggett, Lloyd - 12/12/2001
Rep Evans, Lane - 12/12/2001
Rep Farr, Sam - 12/12/2001
Rep Fattah, Chaka - 12/12/2001
Rep Filner, Bob - 12/12/2001
Rep Frank, Barney - 12/12/2001
Rep Hinchey, Maurice D. - 12/12/2001
Rep Holt, Rush D. - 12/12/2001
Rep Hooley, Darlene - 2/12/2001
Rep Lee, Barbara - 12/12/2001
Rep Lewis, John - 12/12/2001
Rep Markey, Edward J. - 12/12/2001
Rep McDermott, Jim - 12/12/2001
Rep McGovern, James P. - 12/12/2001
Rep McKinney, Cynthia A. - 12/12/2001
Rep Nadler, Jerrold - 12/12/2001
Rep Olver, John W. - 12/12/2001
Rep Payne, Donald M. - 12/12/2001
Rep Rangel, Charles B. - 12/12/2001
Rep Rivers, Lynn N. - 12/12/2001
Rep Sabo, Martin Olav - 12/12/2001
Rep Schakowsky, Janice D. - 12/12/2001
Rep Tierney, John F. - 12/12/2001
Rep Watson, Diane E. - 12/12/2001
3) Statement excerpts from Senators
A. Senator Daschle (D-SD Senate Majority Leader)
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Congressional Quarterly
DASCHLE UNHAPPY THAT LAWMAKERS NOT GIVEN ADVANCE WORD OF ABM DECISION
Emily Pierce CQ Staff Writer
Dec. 12, 2001 - Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle is unhappy with the Bush administrationīs plan to withdraw the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - and that Congress was not given advance word of that decision. At the White House this morning, Daschle said President Bush denied leaking the story to the press and blamed the Russians for disclosing the news before congressional leaders were briefed. But Daschle was no more pleased that Russia knew about the administrationīs plan before Congress. Daschle said abandoning the ABM treaty would complicate U.S. relations with both Russia and China. "Itīs something that ought to have been more carefully deliberated," Daschle said, adding that he was exploring how Congress could respond to the withdrawal from the 1972 treaty that prevents the United States and Russia from developing and deploying anti-ballistic missile systems.
CNN 12/13
Daschle said there are limits to what Congress can do legislatively, but it still has the "power of the purse," suggesting it can hold up funds for missile defense or other White House programs.
"It is unfortunate that the Russians knew before the leaders did," Daschle said. "It's unfortunate that a matter of this import would not have been vetted more carefully or completely and with greater care for U.S. foreign policy than this was."
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B. Senator Levin (D-MI Chair of the Armed Serivices Committee)
http://levin.senate.gov/releases/121301pr1.htm
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
December 13, 2001 CONTACT: Press Office
http://levin.senate.gov
202-224-6221
Levin Statement on President Bush's Decision
to Unilaterally Withdraw From the ABM Treaty
WASHINGTON Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made the following statement today regarding President Bush's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Ensuring the security and safety of the American people, especially from weapons of mass destruction, must remain our first defense priority. If I believed that withdrawing unilaterally from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would enhance our national security, I would support doing so. However, the President's announcement that the United States will unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty is a serious mistake for our national security. It is not necessary and it is not wise.
Unilateral withdrawal is not necessary because the ABM Treaty is not a significant constraint on testing at this time. Indeed, until a few months ago, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was proceeding with research, development and testing that was entirely consistent with the treaty. This approach recognized that the United States can develop and test national missile defenses and stay in the treaty. However, the administration then added new tests that would conflict with the treaty even though these tests are of marginal value.
Unilateral withdrawal is not wise because it focuses on the least likely threats to our security rather than the most likely threats. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that ballistic missiles are the least likely means of delivering a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. The more likely threat comes from a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon being delivered to the United States in a plane, truck, ship or a suitcase, which would be more reliable, less costly, harder to detect and have no "return address" against which to easily retaliate. We need to focus on the most likely threats to our security before accelerating the spending of billions of dollars for defenses against the least likely threats.
Unilateral withdrawal is not wise because it needlessly strains our growing relationship with Russia, a partner in the new war on terrorism. The President's decision also seems to be a violation of his campaign pledge at the Citadel in September 1999, that, if elected, he would "offer Russia the necessary amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty." From newspaper accounts it appears that the administration did not offer amendments to the Russians that would allow us to proceed with the new tests that the administration added. Instead, something much broader was proposed by the administration and not necessarily in the form of amendments. In other words, rather than proceeding with tests permissible under the ABM Treaty or reaching agreement with Russia on amendments to allow for further testing and maintaining the right to withdraw at a later time, the administration has decided at this time to unilaterally withdraw. This is not the way to treat an important nation with which we seek a new relationship based on mutual cooperation. It is fair to ask: What specific amendments to the ABM Treaty were proposed to the Russians by the President as he promised?
Unilateral withdrawal is not wise because it risks upsetting strategic stability. It risks a dangerous action-reaction cycle in offensive and defensive technologies that would leave America less secure. Even though the missile defense system being pursued by the administration is limited, the technologies that would be created as part of this limited system could quickly lead to a much larger program that could in Russian eyes undermine their nuclear deterrent. This could prompt Russia to take the destabilizing step of putting multiple warheads on missiles, so-called MIRVed missiles. This could lead China to rapidly increase their nuclear program. It could also lead China or other countries to devise countermeasures and decoys that they could then sell.
Finally, the President's decision to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty is not wise because it risks undermining our relationships with allies, partners and other nations just when the world is united in a common fight against terrorism. As this multilateral effort clearly demonstrates, our security is enhanced when we make common cause with other nations in pursuit of common goals. In both the short-term and the long-term, our security is diminished when we forge ahead unilaterally regardless of the impact on the security of other nations.
The Armed Services Committee will hold hearings on the administration's decision in the weeks and months ahead.
# # #
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C. Senator Biden (D-DE Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee)
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Excerpts are from a Floor Statement Senator Biden made yesterday.
The title of his remarks is DEFEATING AND PREVENTING TERRORISM TAKES MORE THAN MISSILE DEFENSE -and the full text can be found beginning
at Page: S12998 of the Congressional Record.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to speak to a decision that I am told and have read is about to be made by the President--a very significant decision and, I think, an incredibly dangerous one--to serve notice that the United States of America is going to withdraw from the ABM Treaty .
Under the treaty , as you know, a President is able to give notice 6 months in advance of the intention to withdraw.
Mr. President, we live in tumultuous times. The transition from the old cold war alignments to new patterns of conflict and cooperation is picking up speed. This transition is not quiet, but noisy and violent. For 3 months now, it has been propelled by a new war. . .
How shall we deal with this accelerated and violent transition? How well is the Administration dealing with it?
And is their primary answer--withdrawing from ABM and building a star wars system--at all responsive to our vulnerabilities?
We can find some answers in both the experience of the last 3 months and the President's speech yesterday at the Citadel.
Wars are chaotic events, but they impose a discipline upon us.
We must focus on the highest-priority challenges.
We must use our resources wisely, rather than trying to satisfy every whim.
We must seek out and work with allies, rather than pretending that we can be utterly self-reliant. . .
The President understands this. In his speech yesterday, after talking about the need to modernize our military, he said:
America's next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them..... .
Working with other countries, we will strengthen nonproliferation treaties and toughen export controls. Together we must keep the world's most dangerous technology out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people.
That is correct and well-phrased rhetoric. It gives nonproliferation a high priority. It recognizes the importance of international treaties. But where, Mr. President, are the actions to match that rhetoric? The President offers only a new effort ``to develop a comprehensive strategy on proliferation,'' something he has been promising for over a year.
If you want action with your rhetoric, go down to the No. 3 priority in the President's speech: missile defense. Even there, however, the action is more diplomatic, or rather undiplomatic. If news reports are correct--and I know they are, based on my conversation today with the Secretary of State--the President will shortly announce his intention to withdraw in 6 months' time from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.
Russia will not like that. Some here will say: So what? What does it matter what Russia likes or does not like? But none of our allies likes it either. And China, I predict, will respond with an arms buildup, increasing tensions in South Asia, causing India and Pakistan to reconsider whether to increase their nuclear capability and, as strong as it sounds, in the near term--meaning in the next several years--this will cause the Japanese to Attachment Converted: "c:\temp\debate about whether or not they should be a nuclear power in an =" interest.
But the President will invoke Article XV of the ABM Treaty , which allows a party to withdraw ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interest.'' In my view, invoking this clause is a bit of a stretch, to say the least. No new enemy has fielded an ICBM missile, which is the only missile our national missile defense is intended to stop. Tactical missile defense is not barred by the ABM Treaty , and Russia has said it would even amend the treaty to permit an expanded United States testing program. So where is the jeopardy to our supreme interest?
The administration has said it wants to conduct tests that would breach the ABM Treaty , but the head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in the Pentagon told Congress earlier this year that no breach was needed to do all the tests that were needed and scheduled.
Informed scientists say the features added to the test program that might breach the treaty , which the Defense Department presented to the Armed Services Committee several months ago, are far from necessary, especially at this time. Phil Coyle, the former chief of testing for the Pentagon, says we can conduct several years of needed testing without having to breach the treaty's terms.
The administration wants to build an Alaska test bed with several missile silos at Fort Greely that it says could be used for an emergency deployment. But the new interceptor missile for the missile defense will not be ready yet. The so-called ``kill vehicle,'' the thing that separates from the interceptor missile and hits the incoming warhead, will not have been tested against realistic targets yet. And the radars supporting this system, the battle management capabilities, are pointed at Russia, so they will not even see a North Korean missile as it flies into southern California, following the scenario cited by those who try to justify building a limited missile defense system.
So where is the real action on missile defense? Is the announcement of our intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty a real action, or is it a White House Christmas present for the right wing, who dislike arms control under any circumstances and see this season of success in Afghanistan, unity on foreign policy, and Christmas as a propitious moment to make this announcement?
Is now the time for unilateral moves--now, while we are still building coalitions for a changed world in which old enemies can reduce their differences, at a minimum on the margins, and maybe even work together out of their own self-interest? . . .
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will not make nonproliferation, which should be our highest priority and which combats our clearest danger, any easier to achieve. I find that especially worrisome.
A year ago we were on the verge of a deal with North Korea to end that country's long-range ballistic missile program and its sales of missiles and missile technology. Now we seem far away from such a deal, pursuing instead a missile defense that will be lucky to defend against a first-generation attack, let alone one with simple countermeasures, until the year 2010 or much later. What good will a missile defense in Alaska do, if North Korea threatens Japan or sells to countries that would attack our allies in Europe, or sells to terrorist groups that would put a nuclear weapon in the hull of a rusty tanker coming up the Delaware River or into New York Harbor or San Francisco Bay? How does withdrawal from the ABM Treaty help defend against those much more realistic, near-term threats?
What expenditures of money are we going to engage in? How are we going to deal with what Senator Baker, our Ambassador to Japan and former Republican leader, said is the single most urgent unmet threat that America faces, made real by the knowledge that al-Qaida was trying to purchase a nuclear capability?
We must corral the fissile material and nuclear material in
Russia as well as their chemical weapons. The Baker-Cutler report laid out clearly for us a specific program that would cost $30 billion over the next 8 to 10 years, to shut down one department--the nuclear department--of the candy store that everyone is shopping in.
Senator Lugar actually went to a facility with the Russian military that housed chemical weapons. He describes it as a clapboard building with windows and a padlock on the door, although its security has been improved with our help. He could fit three Howitzer shells in his briefcase. Those shells could do incredible damage to America.
How does withdrawal from the ABM Treaty defend against any of that? Which is more likely--an ICBM attack from a nation that does not now possess the capability, with a return address on it, knowing that certain annihilation would follow if one engaged in the attack; or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology and weaponry, so it can be used surreptitiously?
If you walk away from a treaty with Russia, will that make Russia more inclined to stop its assistance to the Iranian missile program? Or will Russia be more attempted to continue that assistance? Russia has now stated, in a change from what they implied would happen after Crawford, that expansion of NATO, particularly to include the Baltic States, is not something they can likely tolerate--not that we should let that influence our decisions on NATO enlargement. Which do we gain more by--expanding NATO to the Baltic States, or scuttling the ABM Treaty with no immediate promises of gaining a real ability to protect against any of our genuine and immediate threats? If we end the ABM Treaty , will Russia stop nuclear deals of the sort that led us to sanction Russian institutions, or will it cozy up to Iran's illegal nuclear weapons program? . . .
Today the doors to international cooperation and American leadership are wide open. But if we slam them shut too often, we will lose our chance to restructure the world and we will be condemned to repeat the experience of the last century, rather than move beyond it.
Submitted by:
Kathy Crandall, Director
The Nuclear Disarmament Partnership
kcrandall@disarmament.org
www.disarmament.org
Located at the Offices of Physicians for Social Responsibility:
1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1012
Washington, DC 20009
202-667-4260 (ext. 240)
202-667-4201 (fax)
The Nuclear Disarmament Partnership is a joint effort of:
Peace Action, Physicians for Social Responsibility, 20/20 Vision and Women's Action for New Directions
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