|
|
 |
 |
 |
AMERICA AS NUCLEAR ROGUE
New York Times lead editorial -- March 12, 2002
-
If another country were planning to develop a new
nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes
against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington
would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue
state. Yet such is the course recommended to President
Bush by a new Pentagon planning paper that became
public last weekend. Mr. Bush needs to send that
document back to its authors and ask for a new version
less menacing to the security of future American
generations.
The paper, the Nuclear Posture Review, proposes
lowering the overall number of nuclear warheads,
but widens the circumstances thought to justify
a possible nuclear response and expands the list
of countries considered potential nuclear targets.
It envisions, for example, an American president
threatening nuclear retaliation in case of "an
Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, or a
North Korean attack on South Korea or a military
confrontation over the status of Taiwan."
In a world where numerous countries are developing
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, it is
quite right that America retain a credible nuclear
deterrent. Where the Pentagon review goes very
wrong is in lowering the threshold for using nuclear
weapons and in undermining the effectiveness of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The treaty, long America's main tool for discouraging
non-nuclear countries from developing nuclear
weapons, is backed by promises that as long as
signatories stay non-nuclear and avoid combat
alongside a nuclear ally, they will not be attacked
with nuclear weapons. If the Pentagon proposals
become American policy, that promise would be
withdrawn and countries could conclude that they
have no motive to stay non-nuclear. In fact, they
may well decide they need nuclear weapons to avoid
nuclear attack.
The review also calls for the United States to
develop a new nuclear warhead designed to blow
up deep underground bunkers. Adding a new weapon
to America's nuclear arsenal would normally require
a resumption of nuclear testing, ending the voluntary
moratorium on such tests that now helps restrain
the nuclear weapons programs of countries like
North Korea and Iran.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, American military
planners have had to factor these enormously destructive
weapons into their calculations. Their behavior
has been tempered by the belief, shared by most
thoughtful Americans, that the weapons should
be used only when the nation's most basic interest
or national survival is at risk, and that the
unrestrained use of nuclear weapons in war could
end life on earth as we know it. Nuclear weapons
are not just another part of the military arsenal.
They are different, and lowering the threshold
for their use is reckless folly.
Bush's
nuclear plan could make U.S. less safe, not more
By: Rep. Martin Olav Sabo
Published Mar 17, 2002
Star Tribune (Minneapolis)
-
Since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
most reasonable people accept the premise that
nuclear weapons should only be used as a deterrent.
However, President Bush has reportedly charged
the Pentagon with developing new scenarios to
use nuclear weapons.
Despite significant progress in curbing the threat
they pose to world peace, the president wants
to take us backward by elevating nuclear weapons
in U.S. defense policy. His plan will endanger
our national security, rather than increase it,
if it results in a resumption of nuclear testing
worldwide or furthers the spread of nuclear weapons.
Emerging details of Bush's Nuclear Posture Review
betray a dangerous fascination with nuclear war-fighting,
reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. New nuclear weapons
to destroy underground targets will be studied
-- even though conventional weapons are on the
drawing board to do the same thing. Giving nuclear
capabilities to many conventional weapons being
developed is also envisioned. Rather than downsize
our nuclear weapons infrastructure, Bush actually
wants to reinvigorate it by upgrading existing
weapon systems, building new facilities, and producing
new plutonium triggers.
"But
wait a minute, Sabo," you might say. "Doesn't
the president want to reduce the number of U.S.
nuclear warheads?" No, at least not to any significant
degree. While the president has promised to reduce
the number of deployed nuclear warheads from 6,000
down to between 1,700 and 2,200, most of these
warheads will not be destroyed. Instead, they
will be kept in reserve as part of a "responsive
force" that could easily be redeployed. Surge
production capacity will also be retained, making
possible a rapid increase in our nuclear arsenal.
The president's plans mock his commitment to the
U.S. ban on underground nuclear testing, especially
since he continues to oppose Senate ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and
refuses to rule out future nuclear tests. Indeed,
the Nuclear Posture Review recommends reducing
the time it would take to begin a new round of
nuclear tests. The president's nuclear weapons
policy will actually harm our national security
if it leads Russia and China to restart their
own testing programs and end their participation
in the CTBT and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT).
Bush's nuclear obsessions undermine the NPT, the
centerpiece of international efforts to halt the
spread of nuclear weapons, which has succeeded
in confining the problem to a handful of rogue
states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea. While
the president has sought to strengthen the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the institution responsible
for monitoring NPT compliance, a good argument
can be made that his nuclear plans run counter
to our own NPT obligations. How can we persuade
the international community to join us in reining
in other states' nuclear weapons programs when
ours is being rejuvenated?
By planning to use nuclear weapons for war fighting
rather than deterrence, Bush may actually encourage
other states to acquire them in order to deter
U.S. action. In recklessly adding to the list
of states that might feel threatened by our nuclear
weapons, he may be risking confrontations that
could otherwise be avoided by effective diplomacy.
The president should reconsider his nuclear policies.
They will not win the war against terrorism or
make our country more secure. Instead they could
make the world a more dangerous place.
-- Martin Olav Sabo, D-Minn., represents the Fifth
Congressional District and serves on the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.
New
Revelations on U.S. Nuclear Posture
By Marylia Kelley
From Tri-Valley
CAREs' March 2002 newsletter, Citizen's Watch
-
What nuclear watchdog groups had warned in the past
is now making headlines. Special teams of weaponeers
at Livermore Lab are developing new and "modified"
nuclear weapons, including earth-penetrating mini-nukes.
Scientists at Livermore and the other weapons
labs are changing U.S. nuclear weapons to improve
their accuracy, vary their yields (including below
the 5-kiloton, so-called mini-nuke level), adjust
the height at which they burst, and, in some cases,
add new capability to burrow beneath the earth
before detonating. These changes all have one
thing in common. They make U.S. nuclear weapons
more "militarily usable."
New details of the still partially-classified
Nuclear Posture Review, published in the LA Times,
reveal the likely targets for the new weapons.
The Bush Administration has directed the Pentagon
to prepare contingency plans outlining the use
of nuclear bombs against at least seven countries,
five of which do not possess nuclear weaponry.
The seven listed nations are: Russia, China, Iraq,
Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria.
Additionally, the posture review mandates that
preparations be made for the use of nuclear weapons
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a confrontation
between Taiwan and China, an attack by North Korea
on the South, an Iraqi attack against Israel or
another neighboring country and other, unspecified
situations.
The report goes on to outline several general
circumstances in which nuclear bombs may be unleashed.
For example, it contemplates the use of nukes:
against targets of interest (e.g., underground
bunkers and caves) that may be able to withstand
a nonnuclear attack; in retaliation for an attack
with chemical or biological agents; and, "in the
event of surprising military developments."
Reportedly, the posture review does not contain
specific criteria to be used to determine a threshold
level for these contingencies below which the
U.S. would forswear nuclear attack
The new posture review expands the role of nuclear
weapons -- treating them as just another military
option. In so doing, it makes their use in anger
all the more likely.
The document apparently neglects to grapple with
the moral questions posed by the use of nuclear
weapons.
In fact, it seriously undermines the global norm
against their use, which has held since the bombing
of Nagasaki.
The posture review reinforces the destabilizing
message that the Bush Administration is broadcasting
to the world. Put simply, it says that U.S. nuclear
policy is: "We have nukes, we will keep them,
we will develop even more sophisticated capabilities
- and we will use them."
The Nuclear Posture Review violates our country's
legal obligation to disarm under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. It encourages nations that do not possess
nuclear weapons to acquire them. It tells the
already nuclear-armed states to upgrade their
capabilities.
It is reckless and dangerous - and it must be
stopped.
Citizen action is imperative. We will send our
program associate, Inga Olson, to the United Nations
next month for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory
Committee meeting. And, five more Tri-Valley CAREs
volunteer members and staff will travel to Washington,
DC in April to advocate for peace and the environment.
Call us to find out ways you can help.
Tri-Valley CAREs is undertaking a detailed analysis
of the Nuclear Posture Review and related policy
documents. Look for its release soon.
Furse-Spratt
Provision Prohibiting Development of Low-Yield Nuclear
Weapons
National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (PL
103-160)
SEC. 3136. PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
-
a) UNITED STATES POLICY- It shall be the policy
of the United States not to conduct research and
development which could lead to the production
by the United States of a new low-yield nuclear
weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead.
(b) LIMITATION- The Secretary of Energy may not
conduct, or provide for the conduct of, research
and development which could lead to the production
by the United States of a low-yield nuclear weapon
which, as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, has not entered production.
(c) EFFECT ON OTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT-
Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Secretary
of Energy from conducting, or providing for the
conduct of, research and development necessary—
-
(1) to design a testing device that has a yield
of less than five kilotons;
(2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose
of addressing safety and reliability concerns;
or
(3) to address proliferation concerns.
(d)
DEFINITION - In this section, the term `low-yield
nuclear weapon' means a nuclear weapon that has
a yield of less than five kilotons.
Excerpts
from NPR calling for development of new nuclear weapons
(Emphasis added)
- "The
capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing
weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or
develop and field entirely new systems for the
New Triad can discourage other countries from competing
militarily with the United States.” (p. 14)
"The
need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons
complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to
design, develop, manufacture, and certify new
warheads in response to new national requirements;
and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear
testing if required." (p. 30)
"Plutonium
Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability
to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or
so-called "pits". Work is underway to establish
an interim capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory
late in this decade to meet current demand created
by destructive surveillance testing on the W88
warhead. For the long term a new modern production
facility will be needed to deal with the large-scale
replacement of components and new production."
(p. 33)
"Given
the certainty of surprise in the future and the
broad spectrum of threats, the United States also
must have the capability to understand the technological
implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures
tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons
and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional
strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary,
this will enable the United States to initiate
research into whether it needs to develop an entirely
new capability - one that it not a modification
of an existing weapon - in time to address
the threat." (p. 36)
"NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Agency] will accelerate
preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing
facility so that new production capacity can
be brought on line when it is needed." (p. 36)
"New
capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging
threats such as hard and deeply buried targets
(HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable
targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents,
and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage.
Development of these capabilities, to include
extensive research and timely fielding of new
systems to address these challenges, are imperative
to make the New Triad a reality." (p. 46)
Statement by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
on the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review
-
For 56 years, the world has avoided the use of nuclear
weapons despite many grave crises. While nuclear
options were presented to Presidents Truman (Korean
conflict), Eisenhower (Vietnam war) and others,
all Presidents have rejected the option as too dangerous
to the planet and humanity. Ronald Reagan said,
"A nuclear war can not be won and must never be
fought." However, the Bush administration may be
embracing what every previous President has rejected
and could provoke a dangerous escalation of the
nuclear arms race at a time when nuclear weapons
should be eliminated.
The Pentagon has undertaken a Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) that broadens the role of nuclear
weapons beyond their cold war function of deterring
a Soviet attack. According to the NPR, U.S. nuclear
weapons will now target seven countries: Russia,
China, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Situations in which the weapons could be used
include a war in the Middle East between Israel
and Iraq; military conflict between China and
Taiwan; North Korean invasion of South Korea;
or responding to what are vaguely referred to
as "surprising military developments." Understanding
of the danger inherent in nuclear weapons has
clearly been lost.
Since Hiroshima, nuclear weapons have been viewed
as weapons of last resort, posing a threat of
such magnitude that they served as a deterrent.
While a single nuclear bomb could reduce an entire
city to rubble, eight countries have produced
some 50,000 nuclear weapons-enough to destroy
the planet several times over. A nuclear exchange
between India and Pakistan could eradicate one
sixth of humanity. The taboo against using these
terrible weapons has therefore remained strong
despite countless military and political conflicts.
The United States, the only country ever to use
nuclear weapons, has maintained an enormous nuclear
force for the single purpose of deterring a nuclear
attack and has drawn a firm line between the use
of conventional weapons and nuclear bombs. Official
U.S. policy states that nuclear weapons will be
used only against countries that possess such
weapons or ally themselves with a nuclear power.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States
has undertaken to reduce and de-emphasize its
nuclear forces while greatly improving its conventional
weapons capabilities. Today no other nation can
match the United States in overall military spending
- the anticipated fiscal 2003 military budget
of $400 billion is more than the combined defense
expenditures of every other country in the world.
This superiority in non-nuclear weapons has led
some former hard-liners such as Paul Nitze to
recommend abolition of nuclear weapons.
The Nuclear Posture Review signals an unfortunate
reversal of longstanding policy, ending the taboo
against nuclear weapons by including them in the
full range of weapons to be used against countries
with which the U.S. has major disagreements.
The plan also calls for development of new types
of nuclear weapons that can be used against hardened
or deeply buried targets. However, developing
"usable" nuclear weapons with perceived military
value will encourage other states to pursue similar
capabilities. Moreover, even the use of "small"
nuclear weapons will invite other states to retaliate
against the U.S. with larger and more devastating
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
The NPR undermines the 1970 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which 187 countries have signed
and that commits the five major nuclear weapon
states (the U.S., Russia, China, France, and the
UK) to eventual nuclear disarmament. Instead,
the Pentagon plan signals a new nuclear build-up
that will undercut U.S. diplomatic efforts focused
on stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons
to terrorists or hostile states. The few countries
already developing nuclear weapons will become
more determined to do so. Countries that have
agreed not to develop nuclear weapons under the
NPT, already distressed by a growing trend of
U.S. unilateralism, may abandon the treaty in
the face of a U.S. buildup.
If the NPR is made policy, it will undermine U.S.
security by encouraging other states to pursue
nuclear weapons, and thereby increase the likelihood
that nuclear weapons will actually be used.
-
-Hans A. Bethe, one of the original Manhattan
Project scientists and a 1967 Nobel Laureate
in Physics
-Dudley Herschbach, 1986 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry
-John C. Polanyi, also a 1986 Nobel Laureate
in Chemistry
A Pretty Poor Posture for a Superpower
By Robert S. Mcnamara and Thomas Graham Jr. Los Angeles
Times, March 13, 2002
-
During the Cold War, peace was supported by the
doctrine of "mutual assured destruction," which
simply meant that each side maintained second strike
capability, thereby deterring nuclear war. The Antiballistic
Missile Treaty and other treaties limiting the use
of offensive nuclear forces were the underpinning
of this doctrine. They were also the basis for ending
the nuclear arms race.
Now, the Bush administration has moved to a new
nuclear doctrine described by one commentator
as "unilateral assured destruction."
Should the recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review,
or NPR, become official policy, we can expect
nuclear weapons to spread around the world. We
will live in a far more dangerous world, and the
United States will be much less secure.
According to reports describing the NPR, Russia
is still a possible target, but potentially by
offensive forces rather than second-strike nuclear
forces. China also could be a target, with a "military
confrontation over the status of Taiwan" a possible
rationale for a nuclear strike.
The NPR goes even further. It explicitly lists
Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and North Korea as potential
targets for U.S. nuclear forces, putting aside
the ambiguity employed in previous reports. One
thing--perhaps the only thing--that these five
states have in common, however, is that all are
nonnuclear parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.
For 30 years, this treaty has kept nuclear weapons
from spreading all over the world, a development
that would be devastating to U.S. security.
The problem is, however, that in 1978, to bolster
the treaty, the United States, Britain and the
Soviet Union formally pledged never to use nuclear
weapons against nonnuclear countries that were
parties to the treaty except in the case of an
attack in alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
(No exception was made for responding to chemical
or biological attacks.)
This pledge, joined by France and China, was reiterated
in 1995.
And in what could be the most reasonable request
in the history of international relations, in
exchange for agreeing to never acquire nuclear
weapons, 182 nonnuclear nations asked that the
five nuclear weapons states promise never to attack
them with such weapons. This was done in April
1995 in connection with a U.N. Security Council
resolution.
But the Pentagon plan undermines the credibility
of that pledge, which underpins the nonproliferation
treaty.
Further, the basic implication of the NPR--that
the U.S. reserves the right to target any nation
with nuclear weapons whenever it chooses to do
so--is itself likely to increase the risk of the
nuclear weapons proliferation. If a country believes
it's falling out of favor with Washington, what
is the first thing it is likely to do? A quote
attributed to Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes
provides some insight: "Before one challenges
the United States, one must first acquire nuclear
weapons."
Finally, the NPR also appears to set forth a 40-year
plan for developing and acquiring new nuclear
weapons. It reportedly calls for new air, sea
and land launch platforms to be developed and
deployed in 2020, 2030 and 2040, and it calls
for new low-yield and variable-yield warheads
that probably would require nuclear testing. Maintaining
a permanent rationale for a robust U.S. nuclear
arsenal and a resumption of nuclear testing flies
in the face of vital U.S. commitments.
These matters are far too important for the administration
to decide on its own. There must be a full public
debate, in Congress, on the future of our nuclear
deterrent and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Robert
S. McNamara was secretary of Defense from 1961
to 1967. Thomas Graham Jr., the special representative
of the president for arms control and disarmament
during the Clinton administration, is president
of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security and
author of "Disarmament Sketches," due in May from
the University of Washington Press.
Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy
By David Krieger
-
As bad as September 11th may have been, it could
have been far worse. Had As bad as September 11th
may have been, it could have been far worse. Had
terrorists attacked with nuclear weapons, the
death toll could have risen into the millions.
It is likely that even one crude nuclear weapon
would have left Manhattan utterly destroyed, and
with it the financial and communications centers
of the country. Were terrorists to obtain one
or more nuclear weapons and use them on New York,
Washington or other cities, the United States
could cease to exist as a functioning country.
The stakes are very high, and yet the US is creating
new nuclear policies that increase the likelihood
that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons.
A bipartisan commission, headed by Howard Baker
and Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the United States
should be spending some $3 billion per year over
the next ten years to help Russia control its
nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials.
Rather than spend less than one percent of the
current defense budget on dramatically curtailing
the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials
to terrorists or unfriendly regimes, the Bush
administration is trying to save money in this
area. It is spending only one-third of the proposed
amount to help Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons
and materials and find alternative work for nuclear
physicists a woefully inadequate amount if we
are truly attempting to quell nuclear proliferation.
The administration's frugality with regard to
protecting potential "loose nukes" in Russia should
be compared with its generosity for defense spending
in general and for missile defenses in particular.
The president has recently asked for another $48
billion for defense for fiscal 2003, following
an increase of $33.5 billion this year. This year's
budget for ballistic missile defense is $8.3 billion.
Since the likelihood of a terrorist using a missile
to launch a nuclear attack against the United
States or any other country is virtually zero,
it would appear that the administration's budget
priorities are way out of line in terms of providing
real security and protecting the US and other
countries from the threat of nuclear terrorism.
The administration's approach to nuclear disarmament
with the Russians is to place warheads taken off
active deployment onto the shelf so that they
can later be reactivated should our current president
or a future president decide to do so. While the
Russians have made it clear that they would prefer
to destroy the weapons and make nuclear disarmament
irreversible, they will certainly follow the US
lead in also shelving their deactivated warheads.
This will, of course, create even greater security
concerns in Russia and make it more likely that
these weapons will find their way into terrorist
hands.
So what is to be done? The United States must
change its nuclear policies and make good on its
promise to the other 186 parties to the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accomplish the
total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.
This goal can only be achieved with US leadership,
and it is a goal that is absolutely in the interests
of the people of the United States. When the parties
to the NPT meet again this April, the US is sure
to come under heavy criticism for its notice of
withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, its new strategy to make nuclear disarmament
reversible, and its recent announcement that it
is rescinding its security assurances to non-nuclear
weapons states.
In the end, the country that faces the greatest
threat from nuclear terrorism is the United States,
and it is a threat that cannot be counteracted
by missile defenses or threats of retaliation.
Terrorists, who cannot be easily located and who
may be suicidal anyway, will simply not be deterred
by nuclear threat.
If the Bush administration truly wants to reduce
the possibility of nuclear terrorism against US
cities and abroad, it must reverse its current
policy of systematically dismantling the arms
control agreements established over the past four
decades. It must instead become a leader in the
global effort to urgently and dramatically reduce
the level of nuclear weapons throughout the world
and bring the remaining small arsenals of nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials under effective
international controls.
David
Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He can be contacted
at dkrieger@napf.org
|
|
 |
|
|
 |
 |