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AMERICA AS NUCLEAR ROGUE
New York Times lead editorial -- March 12, 2002

If another country were planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state. Yet such is the course recommended to President Bush by a new Pentagon planning paper that became public last weekend. Mr. Bush needs to send that document back to its authors and ask for a new version less menacing to the security of future American generations.

The paper, the Nuclear Posture Review, proposes lowering the overall number of nuclear warheads, but widens the circumstances thought to justify a possible nuclear response and expands the list of countries considered potential nuclear targets. It envisions, for example, an American president threatening nuclear retaliation in case of "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, or a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

In a world where numerous countries are developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, it is quite right that America retain a credible nuclear deterrent. Where the Pentagon review goes very wrong is in lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons and in undermining the effectiveness of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The treaty, long America's main tool for discouraging non-nuclear countries from developing nuclear weapons, is backed by promises that as long as signatories stay non-nuclear and avoid combat alongside a nuclear ally, they will not be attacked with nuclear weapons. If the Pentagon proposals become American policy, that promise would be withdrawn and countries could conclude that they have no motive to stay non-nuclear. In fact, they may well decide they need nuclear weapons to avoid nuclear attack.

The review also calls for the United States to develop a new nuclear warhead designed to blow up deep underground bunkers. Adding a new weapon to America's nuclear arsenal would normally require a resumption of nuclear testing, ending the voluntary moratorium on such tests that now helps restrain the nuclear weapons programs of countries like North Korea and Iran.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, American military planners have had to factor these enormously destructive weapons into their calculations. Their behavior has been tempered by the belief, shared by most thoughtful Americans, that the weapons should be used only when the nation's most basic interest or national survival is at risk, and that the unrestrained use of nuclear weapons in war could end life on earth as we know it. Nuclear weapons are not just another part of the military arsenal. They are different, and lowering the threshold for their use is reckless folly.


Bush's nuclear plan could make U.S. less safe, not more
By: Rep. Martin Olav Sabo
Published Mar 17, 2002
Star Tribune (Minneapolis)

Since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most reasonable people accept the premise that nuclear weapons should only be used as a deterrent. However, President Bush has reportedly charged the Pentagon with developing new scenarios to use nuclear weapons.

Despite significant progress in curbing the threat they pose to world peace, the president wants to take us backward by elevating nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy. His plan will endanger our national security, rather than increase it, if it results in a resumption of nuclear testing worldwide or furthers the spread of nuclear weapons.

Emerging details of Bush's Nuclear Posture Review betray a dangerous fascination with nuclear war-fighting, reminiscent of Dr. Strangelove. New nuclear weapons to destroy underground targets will be studied -- even though conventional weapons are on the drawing board to do the same thing. Giving nuclear capabilities to many conventional weapons being developed is also envisioned. Rather than downsize our nuclear weapons infrastructure, Bush actually wants to reinvigorate it by upgrading existing weapon systems, building new facilities, and producing new plutonium triggers.

"But wait a minute, Sabo," you might say. "Doesn't the president want to reduce the number of U.S. nuclear warheads?" No, at least not to any significant degree. While the president has promised to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads from 6,000 down to between 1,700 and 2,200, most of these warheads will not be destroyed. Instead, they will be kept in reserve as part of a "responsive force" that could easily be redeployed. Surge production capacity will also be retained, making possible a rapid increase in our nuclear arsenal.

The president's plans mock his commitment to the U.S. ban on underground nuclear testing, especially since he continues to oppose Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and refuses to rule out future nuclear tests. Indeed, the Nuclear Posture Review recommends reducing the time it would take to begin a new round of nuclear tests. The president's nuclear weapons policy will actually harm our national security if it leads Russia and China to restart their own testing programs and end their participation in the CTBT and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Bush's nuclear obsessions undermine the NPT, the centerpiece of international efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, which has succeeded in confining the problem to a handful of rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea. While the president has sought to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, the institution responsible for monitoring NPT compliance, a good argument can be made that his nuclear plans run counter to our own NPT obligations. How can we persuade the international community to join us in reining in other states' nuclear weapons programs when ours is being rejuvenated?

By planning to use nuclear weapons for war fighting rather than deterrence, Bush may actually encourage other states to acquire them in order to deter U.S. action. In recklessly adding to the list of states that might feel threatened by our nuclear weapons, he may be risking confrontations that could otherwise be avoided by effective diplomacy.

The president should reconsider his nuclear policies. They will not win the war against terrorism or make our country more secure. Instead they could make the world a more dangerous place.

-- Martin Olav Sabo, D-Minn., represents the Fifth Congressional District and serves on the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.


New Revelations on U.S. Nuclear Posture
By Marylia Kelley
From Tri-Valley CAREs' March 2002 newsletter, Citizen's Watch

What nuclear watchdog groups had warned in the past is now making headlines. Special teams of weaponeers at Livermore Lab are developing new and "modified" nuclear weapons, including earth-penetrating mini-nukes.

Scientists at Livermore and the other weapons labs are changing U.S. nuclear weapons to improve their accuracy, vary their yields (including below the 5-kiloton, so-called mini-nuke level), adjust the height at which they burst, and, in some cases, add new capability to burrow beneath the earth before detonating. These changes all have one thing in common. They make U.S. nuclear weapons more "militarily usable."

New details of the still partially-classified Nuclear Posture Review, published in the LA Times, reveal the likely targets for the new weapons. The Bush Administration has directed the Pentagon to prepare contingency plans outlining the use of nuclear bombs against at least seven countries, five of which do not possess nuclear weaponry. The seven listed nations are: Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria.

Additionally, the posture review mandates that preparations be made for the use of nuclear weapons in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a confrontation between Taiwan and China, an attack by North Korea on the South, an Iraqi attack against Israel or another neighboring country and other, unspecified situations.

The report goes on to outline several general circumstances in which nuclear bombs may be unleashed. For example, it contemplates the use of nukes: against targets of interest (e.g., underground bunkers and caves) that may be able to withstand a nonnuclear attack; in retaliation for an attack with chemical or biological agents; and, "in the event of surprising military developments."

Reportedly, the posture review does not contain specific criteria to be used to determine a threshold level for these contingencies below which the U.S. would forswear nuclear attack

The new posture review expands the role of nuclear weapons -- treating them as just another military option. In so doing, it makes their use in anger all the more likely.

The document apparently neglects to grapple with the moral questions posed by the use of nuclear weapons.

In fact, it seriously undermines the global norm against their use, which has held since the bombing of Nagasaki.

The posture review reinforces the destabilizing message that the Bush Administration is broadcasting to the world. Put simply, it says that U.S. nuclear policy is: "We have nukes, we will keep them, we will develop even more sophisticated capabilities - and we will use them."

The Nuclear Posture Review violates our country's legal obligation to disarm under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It encourages nations that do not possess nuclear weapons to acquire them. It tells the already nuclear-armed states to upgrade their capabilities.

It is reckless and dangerous - and it must be stopped.

Citizen action is imperative. We will send our program associate, Inga Olson, to the United Nations next month for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting. And, five more Tri-Valley CAREs volunteer members and staff will travel to Washington, DC in April to advocate for peace and the environment. Call us to find out ways you can help.

Tri-Valley CAREs is undertaking a detailed analysis of the Nuclear Posture Review and related policy documents. Look for its release soon.


Furse-Spratt Provision Prohibiting Development of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (PL 103-160)
SEC. 3136. PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

a) UNITED STATES POLICY- It shall be the policy of the United States not to conduct research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead.

(b) LIMITATION- The Secretary of Energy may not conduct, or provide for the conduct of, research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, has not entered production.

(c) EFFECT ON OTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT- Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Secretary of Energy from conducting, or providing for the conduct of, research and development necessary—

(1) to design a testing device that has a yield of less than five kilotons;

(2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and reliability concerns; or

(3) to address proliferation concerns.

(d) DEFINITION - In this section, the term `low-yield nuclear weapon' means a nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than five kilotons.


Excerpts from NPR calling for development of new nuclear weapons
(Emphasis added)

"The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop and field entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage other countries from competing militarily with the United States.” (p. 14)

"The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required." (p. 30)

"Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called "pits". Work is underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by destructive surveillance testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a new modern production facility will be needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production." (p. 33)

"Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability - one that it not a modification of an existing weapon - in time to address the threat." (p. 36)

"NNSA [National Nuclear Security Agency] will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line when it is needed." (p. 36)

"New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad a reality." (p. 46)


Statement by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
on the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review

For 56 years, the world has avoided the use of nuclear weapons despite many grave crises. While nuclear options were presented to Presidents Truman (Korean conflict), Eisenhower (Vietnam war) and others, all Presidents have rejected the option as too dangerous to the planet and humanity. Ronald Reagan said, "A nuclear war can not be won and must never be fought." However, the Bush administration may be embracing what every previous President has rejected and could provoke a dangerous escalation of the nuclear arms race at a time when nuclear weapons should be eliminated.

The Pentagon has undertaken a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that broadens the role of nuclear weapons beyond their cold war function of deterring a Soviet attack. According to the NPR, U.S. nuclear weapons will now target seven countries: Russia, China, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Situations in which the weapons could be used include a war in the Middle East between Israel and Iraq; military conflict between China and Taiwan; North Korean invasion of South Korea; or responding to what are vaguely referred to as "surprising military developments." Understanding of the danger inherent in nuclear weapons has clearly been lost.

Since Hiroshima, nuclear weapons have been viewed as weapons of last resort, posing a threat of such magnitude that they served as a deterrent. While a single nuclear bomb could reduce an entire city to rubble, eight countries have produced some 50,000 nuclear weapons-enough to destroy the planet several times over. A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could eradicate one sixth of humanity. The taboo against using these terrible weapons has therefore remained strong despite countless military and political conflicts.

The United States, the only country ever to use nuclear weapons, has maintained an enormous nuclear force for the single purpose of deterring a nuclear attack and has drawn a firm line between the use of conventional weapons and nuclear bombs. Official U.S. policy states that nuclear weapons will be used only against countries that possess such weapons or ally themselves with a nuclear power.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has undertaken to reduce and de-emphasize its nuclear forces while greatly improving its conventional weapons capabilities. Today no other nation can match the United States in overall military spending - the anticipated fiscal 2003 military budget of $400 billion is more than the combined defense expenditures of every other country in the world. This superiority in non-nuclear weapons has led some former hard-liners such as Paul Nitze to recommend abolition of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Posture Review signals an unfortunate reversal of longstanding policy, ending the taboo against nuclear weapons by including them in the full range of weapons to be used against countries with which the U.S. has major disagreements.

The plan also calls for development of new types of nuclear weapons that can be used against hardened or deeply buried targets. However, developing "usable" nuclear weapons with perceived military value will encourage other states to pursue similar capabilities. Moreover, even the use of "small" nuclear weapons will invite other states to retaliate against the U.S. with larger and more devastating nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

The NPR undermines the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which 187 countries have signed and that commits the five major nuclear weapon states (the U.S., Russia, China, France, and the UK) to eventual nuclear disarmament. Instead, the Pentagon plan signals a new nuclear build-up that will undercut U.S. diplomatic efforts focused on stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists or hostile states. The few countries already developing nuclear weapons will become more determined to do so. Countries that have agreed not to develop nuclear weapons under the NPT, already distressed by a growing trend of U.S. unilateralism, may abandon the treaty in the face of a U.S. buildup.

If the NPR is made policy, it will undermine U.S. security by encouraging other states to pursue nuclear weapons, and thereby increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will actually be used.

-Hans A. Bethe, one of the original Manhattan Project scientists and a 1967 Nobel Laureate in Physics
-Dudley Herschbach, 1986 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry
-John C. Polanyi, also a 1986 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry


A Pretty Poor Posture for a Superpower
By Robert S. Mcnamara and Thomas Graham Jr. Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2002

During the Cold War, peace was supported by the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction," which simply meant that each side maintained second strike capability, thereby deterring nuclear war. The Antiballistic Missile Treaty and other treaties limiting the use of offensive nuclear forces were the underpinning of this doctrine. They were also the basis for ending the nuclear arms race.

Now, the Bush administration has moved to a new nuclear doctrine described by one commentator as "unilateral assured destruction."

Should the recently leaked Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR, become official policy, we can expect nuclear weapons to spread around the world. We will live in a far more dangerous world, and the United States will be much less secure.

According to reports describing the NPR, Russia is still a possible target, but potentially by offensive forces rather than second-strike nuclear forces. China also could be a target, with a "military confrontation over the status of Taiwan" a possible rationale for a nuclear strike.

The NPR goes even further. It explicitly lists Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and North Korea as potential targets for U.S. nuclear forces, putting aside the ambiguity employed in previous reports. One thing--perhaps the only thing--that these five states have in common, however, is that all are nonnuclear parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

For 30 years, this treaty has kept nuclear weapons from spreading all over the world, a development that would be devastating to U.S. security.

The problem is, however, that in 1978, to bolster the treaty, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union formally pledged never to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries that were parties to the treaty except in the case of an attack in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. (No exception was made for responding to chemical or biological attacks.)

This pledge, joined by France and China, was reiterated in 1995.

And in what could be the most reasonable request in the history of international relations, in exchange for agreeing to never acquire nuclear weapons, 182 nonnuclear nations asked that the five nuclear weapons states promise never to attack them with such weapons. This was done in April 1995 in connection with a U.N. Security Council resolution.

But the Pentagon plan undermines the credibility of that pledge, which underpins the nonproliferation treaty.

Further, the basic implication of the NPR--that the U.S. reserves the right to target any nation with nuclear weapons whenever it chooses to do so--is itself likely to increase the risk of the nuclear weapons proliferation. If a country believes it's falling out of favor with Washington, what is the first thing it is likely to do? A quote attributed to Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes provides some insight: "Before one challenges the United States, one must first acquire nuclear weapons."

Finally, the NPR also appears to set forth a 40-year plan for developing and acquiring new nuclear weapons. It reportedly calls for new air, sea and land launch platforms to be developed and deployed in 2020, 2030 and 2040, and it calls for new low-yield and variable-yield warheads that probably would require nuclear testing. Maintaining a permanent rationale for a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal and a resumption of nuclear testing flies in the face of vital U.S. commitments.

These matters are far too important for the administration to decide on its own. There must be a full public debate, in Congress, on the future of our nuclear deterrent and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Robert S. McNamara was secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1967. Thomas Graham Jr., the special representative of the president for arms control and disarmament during the Clinton administration, is president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security and author of "Disarmament Sketches," due in May from the University of Washington Press.


Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy
By David Krieger

As bad as September 11th may have been, it could have been far worse. Had As bad as September 11th may have been, it could have been far worse. Had terrorists attacked with nuclear weapons, the death toll could have risen into the millions. It is likely that even one crude nuclear weapon would have left Manhattan utterly destroyed, and with it the financial and communications centers of the country. Were terrorists to obtain one or more nuclear weapons and use them on New York, Washington or other cities, the United States could cease to exist as a functioning country. The stakes are very high, and yet the US is creating new nuclear policies that increase the likelihood that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons.

A bipartisan commission, headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the United States should be spending some $3 billion per year over the next ten years to help Russia control its nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials. Rather than spend less than one percent of the current defense budget on dramatically curtailing the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists or unfriendly regimes, the Bush administration is trying to save money in this area. It is spending only one-third of the proposed amount to help Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons and materials and find alternative work for nuclear physicists a woefully inadequate amount if we are truly attempting to quell nuclear proliferation.

The administration's frugality with regard to protecting potential "loose nukes" in Russia should be compared with its generosity for defense spending in general and for missile defenses in particular. The president has recently asked for another $48 billion for defense for fiscal 2003, following an increase of $33.5 billion this year. This year's budget for ballistic missile defense is $8.3 billion. Since the likelihood of a terrorist using a missile to launch a nuclear attack against the United States or any other country is virtually zero, it would appear that the administration's budget priorities are way out of line in terms of providing real security and protecting the US and other countries from the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The administration's approach to nuclear disarmament with the Russians is to place warheads taken off active deployment onto the shelf so that they can later be reactivated should our current president or a future president decide to do so. While the Russians have made it clear that they would prefer to destroy the weapons and make nuclear disarmament irreversible, they will certainly follow the US lead in also shelving their deactivated warheads. This will, of course, create even greater security concerns in Russia and make it more likely that these weapons will find their way into terrorist hands.

So what is to be done? The United States must change its nuclear policies and make good on its promise to the other 186 parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. This goal can only be achieved with US leadership, and it is a goal that is absolutely in the interests of the people of the United States. When the parties to the NPT meet again this April, the US is sure to come under heavy criticism for its notice of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its new strategy to make nuclear disarmament reversible, and its recent announcement that it is rescinding its security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.

In the end, the country that faces the greatest threat from nuclear terrorism is the United States, and it is a threat that cannot be counteracted by missile defenses or threats of retaliation. Terrorists, who cannot be easily located and who may be suicidal anyway, will simply not be deterred by nuclear threat.

If the Bush administration truly wants to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism against US cities and abroad, it must reverse its current policy of systematically dismantling the arms control agreements established over the past four decades. It must instead become a leader in the global effort to urgently and dramatically reduce the level of nuclear weapons throughout the world and bring the remaining small arsenals of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials under effective international controls.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He can be contacted at dkrieger@napf.org

 

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