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Senate Armed
Services Committee: Feb. 14, 2002
Hearing on Nuclear Posture Review
Statements
by:
- Douglas
Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
- Admiral
James Ellis, USN Commander in Chief, US Strategic
Command
- General
John Gordon, National Nuclear Security Administration
Statement
of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Senate Armed Services Hearing on the Nuclear Posture
Review
February 14, 2002
- Introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2001 required the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy,
to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear
forces and to develop a long-range plan for
the sustainment and modernization of United
States strategic nuclear forces. The Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) constitutes the Department
of Defense response to this requirement.
We submitted the NPR to Congress on January
8, 2002. It is the first comprehensive review
of nuclear forces since 1994, when the first
Nuclear Posture Review was completed. The
primary purpose of the 1994 review was to
determine the strategic nuclear force structure
to be deployed under the second Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).
The current review of the U.S. nuclear posture
differs from the 1994 review. The 1994 review
assumed that the central strategic U.S. concern
was managing a potentially hostile relationship
between the two largest nuclear powers. The
current review recognizes that the United
States and Russia have a new relationship,
and that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles has created new challenges
for deterrence. It defines the capabilities
required of the nuclear forces in the new
strategic environment, and in relation to
other U.S. defense capabilities. Most especially,
it recognizes that Russia, unlike the Soviet
Union, is not an enemy. There is ground for
mutual cooperation, and the United States
is seeking to move beyond the outdated Cold
War nuclear confrontation to develop a new
strategic framework with Russia.
A
New Era
The basic features of the Cold War shaped
our approach to security, including the role
and size of our nuclear forces and deterrence
policies. Our current nuclear triad of ICBMs,
bombers, and ballistic missile submarines,
and the ways we have pursued deterrence and
arms control negotiations, reflect the conditions
of Cold War. The new features of the international
system, particularly the types of threats
we face, are dramatically different. Consequently,
President Bush charged the Department of Defense
with transforming our approach to defense,
including nuclear weapons and missile defenses,
to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold
War era.
During the Cold War we faced a single, ideologically
hostile nuclear superpower. We prepared for
a relatively limited number of very threatening
conflicts with the Soviet Union. Much of the
world was part of two competing alliances
and the stakes involved in this competition
were survival for both sides. We must never
lose sight of just how dangerous the situation
was.
There was, however, considerable continuity
and predictability in this competition of
two global alliance systems. For decades,
U.S. nuclear forces were organized and sized
primarily to deter the Soviet Union, and there
were few sharp turns in U.S.-Soviet relations.
Based on the continuities of the international
system at the time, the successful functioning
of nuclear deterrence came to be viewed as
predictable, ensured by a sturdy "balance
of terror." Many argued that defenses which
might lessen that terror by offering protection
against Soviet nuclear attack would instead
undermine the predictable "stability" of the
balance of terror.
The Cold War system of two competing blocs
has been replaced by a new system, one with
a broad spectrum of potential opponents and
threatening contingencies. The continuities
of the past U.S.-Soviet relationship have
been replaced by the unpredictability of potential
opponents who are motivated by goals and values
we often do not share nor well understand,
and who move in directions we may not anticipate.
We no longer confront the severe but relatively
predictable threats of the Cold War; instead
we have entered an era of uncertainty and
surprise. As the attacks of September 11th
demonstrated, we must now expect the unexpected.
What we can predict today is that we will
face unanticipated challenges, a range of
opponents-some familiar, some not- with varying
goals and military capabilities, and a spectrum
of potential contingencies involving very
different stakes for the United States and
its foes. These conditions do not permit confident
predictions about the specific threats against
which we must prepare or the "stability" of
deterrence.
Of particular concern in this era of uncertainty
is the emergence of hostile, regional powers
armed with missiles and nuclear, biological,
or chemical weapons of mass destruction. When
the U.S. failed to deter or promptly defeat
a challenge in the past, two great oceans
generally provided protection to American
civil life. Nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons technology, however, increasingly
is in the hands of brutal leaders who have
few institutional or moral constraints and
are motivated by an extreme hatred of the
United States and the personal freedoms and
liberties we hold dear. This emerging feature
of the international landscape has rendered
the failure to deter or promptly defeat a
threat much more dangerous for all Americans.
We can no longer take comfort in the belief
that the conflict will be "over there," or
that opponents will be deterred in predictable
ways. As was illustrated by September 11th,
we now confront enemies who are eager to inflict
mass destruction on innocent civilians here
and abroad, without regard for the possible
cost.
Transforming
Defense
What are the implications of these changes
in the international system for how we think
about security? Most basically, we must transform
our forces and planning to meet the dramatically
different conditions of the new security environment.
Rather than focusing on a single peer opponent,
and preparing for a few threatening contingencies,
we now need the flexibility to tailor military
capabilities to a wide spectrum of contingencies,
to address the unexpected, and to prepare
for the uncertainties of deterrence. We can
no longer approach our military requirements
by conveniently defining one or a few countries
as the specified "threat," and then sizing
our military capabilities against that defined
threat. U.S. planning can no longer be so
"threat-based" because, in an era of uncertainty,
the precise source of "the threat" is unpredictable.
Our defense preparations must now focus on,
and be responsive to, a wide spectrum of potential
opponents, contingencies, and threatening
capabilities, some of which will be surprising.
A capabilities-based approach to defense planning
will look more at the broad range of capabilities
and contingencies that the United States may
confront in the future, as opposed to planning
against a fixed set of opponents identified
as the threat.
Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential,
particularly for assuring allies and friends
of U.S. security commitments, dissuading arms
competition, deterring hostile leaders who
are willing to accept great risk and cost
to further their evil ends, and for holding
at risk highly threatening targets that cannot
be addressed by other means. Instead of our
past primary reliance on nuclear forces for
deterrence, we will need a broad array of
nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities
for an era of uncertainty and surprise. The
United States will transform its strategic
planning from an approach that has been based
almost exclusively on offensive nuclear weapons,
to one that also includes a range of non-nuclear
and defensive capabilities. In particular,
because deterrence will function less predictably
in the future, the United States will need
options to defend itself, its allies and friends
against attacks that cannot be deterred.
A
New Triad for a New Era
The current nuclear triad is a legacy of the
Cold War. It is exclusively nuclear and offensive.
As part of the defense transformation, we
will move to a New Triad. The New Triad comprises
a more diverse set of nuclear and non-nuclear,
offensive and defensive capabilities. These
capabilities encompass nuclear forces and
non-nuclear strike means (including information
warfare), passive and active defenses (notably
missile defense), and the defense-industrial
infrastructure needed to build and sustain
the offensive and defensive elements of the
New Triad. Command, control and intelligence
systems are also critical to deterrence. They
form an integral part of the New Triad.
This New Triad will provide the United States
with the broad range of capabilities suitable
for an era of uncertainty and a wide variety
of potential opponents and contingencies.
In some cases, where nuclear weapons may have
been necessary for deterrence and defense
in the past, the use of advanced non-nuclear
strike capabilities or defensive systems may
now be sufficient militarily, involve less
risk for the U.S. and our allies, and be more
credible to foes. In some cases, nuclear weapons
may remain necessary to deter or defeat a
particularly severe threat. The New Triad
will provide the spectrum of offensive and
defensive military capabilities, and the flexibility
in planning necessary to address the new range
of contingencies, including the unexpected
and the undeterrable.
The New Triad differs in a number of important
ways from the current triad. In addition to
the difference in its overall composition,
the strategic nuclear forces of the New Triad
are divided into two new categories: the operationally
deployed force and the responsive force.
The operationally deployed force includes
bomber and missile warheads that are available
immediately or within a matter of days. These
forces will be available to address immediate
or unexpected contingencies. Thus, our stated
nuclear forces will correspond to our actual
nuclear deployments, which did not occur during
the Cold War.
By using such "truth in advertising," we will
no longer count "phantom warheads" that could
be deployed, but are not. To address potential
contingencies-more severe dangers that could
emerge over a longer period of time-the responsive
force augments the operationally deployed
force, largely through the loading of additional
warheads on bombers and ballistic missiles.
Such a process would take weeks to years.
The capability for force reconstitution provided
by the responsive force allows significant
reduction in the current number of operationally
deployed nuclear warheads. This reduction
can be achieved prudently and without the
need for drawn out and difficult negotiations.
In addition, the New Triad expressly serves
multiple defense policy goals. Deterrence
of nuclear or large-scale conventional aggression
was viewed as the main objective of the Cold
War triad. The deterrence of aggression, although
still an essential aim, is just one of four
defense policy goals for the New Triad. The
capabilities of the New Triad, like other
U.S. military forces, not only must deter
coercion or attack, but also must assure allies
and friends of U.S. security commitments,
dissuade adversaries from competing militarily
with the United States, and, if deterrence
fails, decisively defeat an enemy while defending
against its attacks on the United States,
our friends, and our allies. Linking nuclear
forces to multiple defense policy goals, and
not simply to deterrence, recognizes that
these forces, and the other parts of the New
Triad, perform key missions in peacetime as
well as in crisis or conflict. How well the
New Triad serves these multiple goals¾thereby
enabling us to cope effectively with the uncertainty
and unpredictability of the security environment
is the standard for judging its value.
The New Triad offers several advantages in
this regard. Its more varied portfolio of
capabilities, for example, makes it a more
flexible military instrument. This greater
flexibility offers the President more options
for deterring or defeating aggression. Within
the New Triad, nuclear forces will be integrated
with, rather than treated in isolation from,
other military capabilities. This creates
opportunities for substituting non-nuclear
strike capabilities for nuclear forces and
defensive systems for offensive means. This
does will not blur the line between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapons, but it will reduce
the pressures to resort to nuclear weapons
by giving U.S. Presidents non-nuclear options
to ensure U.S. security.
The New Triad reflects a capabilities-based
approach to nuclear force planning and the
type of defense transformation required in
a new era. It deserves wide support. It gives
the United States the greater strategic flexibility
needed in an era characterized by surprise.
It provides the basis for shifting some of
the strategic requirements for dissuading,
deterring, and defeating aggression from nuclear
forces to non-nuclear strike capabilities,
defensive systems, and a responsive infrastructure.
As we reduce our nuclear forces to bring them
into line with the security environment, the
New Triad will mitigate the risks inherent
in an increasingly fluid and dynamic security
environment.
Getting to the New Triad will require us to
sustain a smaller strategic nuclear force,
reinvigorate our defense infrastructure, and
develop new non-nuclear strike, command and
control, intelligence, and planning capabilities
so that we possess the ability to respond
to the kinds of surprises the new security
environment holds. By taking these steps,
we will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons
and build a New Triad that serves a broader
range of American national security goals.
Strategic
Nuclear Forces in the New Triad
The positive shift in the U.S. relationship
with Russia is of great significance in considering
today's nuclear force requirements. Russia
is not the Soviet Union, nor is it an enemy.
We no longer have to focus our energies on
preparing for a massive Soviet nuclear first
strike. Rather, we now seek a new strategic
framework with Russia to replace the Cold
War's balance of terror.
President Bush has announced his decision
to reduce our operationally deployed strategic
nuclear force to 1700-2200 warheads over the
next decade, a level informed by the analysis
of the NPR. While roughly one-third the number
of our currently operationally deployed warheads,
this range is adequate to support our new
defense policy goals, including the deterrence
of immediate contingencies. It also preserves
the flexibility and capability for reconstitution
necessary to adapt to any adverse changes
in the new security environment.
These reductions, and other adjustments in
our offensive and defensive capabilities,
will be achieved outside the Cold War's adversarial
and endless negotiating process that was centered
on the balance of nuclear terror. Today, that
competitive and legalistic process would be
counterproductive. It would impede or derail
the significant reductions both sides now
want; it would lock both sides into fixed
nuclear arsenals that could be excessive or
inadequate in the future; and, by perpetuating
the Cold War strategic relationship, it would
inhibit movement to a far better strategic
framework for relations.
I would like to highlight five key findings
of the NPR. Each needs to be well understood:
-
A New Relationship With Russia: Away From
MAD
The planned reductions to 1700-2200 operationally
deployed nuclear warheads are possible and
prudent given the new relationship with
Russia. We can reduce the number of operationally
deployed warheads to this level because,
in the NPR, we excluded from our calculation
of nuclear requirements for immediate contingencies
the previous, long-standing requirements
centered on the Soviet Union and, more recently,
Russia. This is a dramatic departure from
the Cold War approach to nuclear force sizing,
which focused first and foremost on sustaining
our side of the balance of terror and mutual
assured destruction (MAD). In the NPR we
moved away from this MAD policy framework.
This, of course, is not to imply that
we will not retain significant nuclear
capabilities, or that we can ignore developments
in Russia's (or any other nation's) nuclear
arsenal. Nuclear capabilities will continue
to be essential to our security, and that
of our friends and allies.
Nevertheless, we no longer consider a
MAD relationship with Russia the appropriate
basis for calculating our nuclear requirements.
MAD is a strategic relationship appropriate
to enemies, to deep-seated hostility,
and distrust. Russia is not our enemy,
and we look forward to a new strategic
framework for our relations.
-
Reductions Plus Security
The President's plan for nuclear reductions
permits us to cut the number of operationally
deployed nuclear weapons by about 65%, to
levels far below current levels, without
taking great risks with America's safety.
The new relationship with Russia makes such
cuts possible, and the President's plan
prudently preserves our option to respond
to the possible emergence of new threats.
Some commentators say we should continue
to reduce our forces without preserving
our capacity to adapt to changing circumstances,
but doing so would require an ability to
predict the future with enough accuracy
to ensure we will not be surprised or face
new threats.
Because the future almost certainly will,
in fact, bring new dangers, we do not
believe it is prudent to set in stone
the level and type of U.S. nuclear capabilities.
We have embarked on a program to deploy
a New Triad that may allow us increasingly
to rely on non-nuclear capabilities, and
under the President's plan we have the
option to adjust our nuclear forces down
even further than now planned if appropriate.
If severe new threats emerge, however,
we must also retain the capacity to respond
as necessary. The President's plan is
a reasonable way to both reduce nuclear
forces and prudently preserve our capability
to adjust to the shifting requirements
of a dynamic security environment. In
the NPR we have recognized that force
requirements are driven fundamentally
by the realities of a changing threat
environment, and we have adopted, in the
capabilities-based approach, the commonsense
standard that we must retain the flexibility
necessary to adjust to and shape that
environment.
-
New Emphasis on Non-nuclear and Defensive
Capabilities
The President's plan, for the first time,
emphasizes the potential for substituting
non-nuclear and defensive capabilities for
nuclear capabilities. In many likely cases
involving an attack against us, our allies
or friends, it will be far better to have
non-nuclear and defensive responses available.
For example, during the Cold War, one of
the President's only options to limit damage
to the United States was to strike the enemy's
offensive weapons, raising the stakes in
any confrontation.
Defenses will offer the ability to limit
damage to the United States without requiring
America to "fire the first shot." In the
case of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed
missiles, defenses will give us the opportunity
to destroy such weapons before they inflict
any damage on the United States, its friends,
or allies. The NPR, for the first time,
explicitly calls for the integration of
non-nuclear and defensive capabilities
as part of our strategic triad. This is
another reason we can move forward with
deep nuclear reductions while being careful
to preserve our security. The new non-nuclear
and defensive capabilities that are emphasized
in the NPR may also provide the basis
for further nuclear reductions in the
future, depending on their effectiveness.
-
A New Diverse Portfolio of Military Capabilities
for an New World
The NPR's call for a New Triad begins the
transformation of our strategic capabilities
to suit a world that is very different from
that of the Cold War. In the past we focused
on the Soviet Union and a few severely threatening
contingencies. We prepared our military
to address this relatively narrow Cold War
threat.
Today the sources of the threats that
face us are much more diverse and even
unpredictable, as the September 11 attacks
showed. The spread of missiles and weapons
of mass destruction makes the current
spectrum of potential opponents significant.
Whereas in the past, only the Soviet Union
posed a serious threat to American cities,
in the foreseeable future, several countries¾and
perhaps some non-state actors¾will present
such a risk. Our defensive capabilities
must take these new post-Cold War realities
into account.
The President's plan will transform our
military to provide us with a new portfolio
of capabilities to meet these new threats,
even while reducing our reliance on nuclear
weapons. This portfolio will enable us
not only to tailor our force options to
the range of potential contingencies and
types of opponents, it will help us to
shape the threat environment in the most
benign directions possible.
-
The Rejection of Adversarial Negotiations
The rejection of the Cold War's adversarial-style
of arms control negotiations represents
a key change introduced in the NPR. The
NPR moves us beyond the essentially hostile
and competitive negotiations of the Cold
War because such negotiations no longer
reflect the reality of U.S.-Russian relations.
We do not negotiate with Britain or France
with regard to the permitted features of
our respective nuclear capabilities. Although
our relations with Russia are not yet comparable
to our relations with our allies, they are
not based on Cold War hostilities.
Were we to have put nuclear reductions
on hold until we could have hammered out
a Cold War-style arms control agreement
with Russia, we would not be making the
reductions we plan over the next decade.
We would be under pressure to hold on
to the weapons we no longer require as
bargaining chips because that is the logic
of adversarial arms control. Russia would
be pressed by the same logic.
We see no reason to try to dictate the
size and composition of Russia's strategic
nuclear forces by legal means. Russian
forces, like our forces, will decline
about two-thirds over the next decade.
In truth, if the Russian government considers
the security environment threatening enough
to require an adjustment in its nuclear
capabilities, it would pursue that adjustment
irrespective of its obligations under
a Cold War-style treaty. In fact, the
Russian government did just that in 1995
with regard to the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Because the security
situation had changed, Russia did not
meet its obligations to reduce its conventional
forces to the proscribed levels. The Russian
Defense Minister at the time stated that
Moscow would not fulfill legal obligations
that "bind us hand and foot."
A highly dynamic security environment
such as we now confront ultimately cannot
be tamed by rigid, legal constructs, however
sincerely entered into. It would be highly
imprudent now to rigidly fix our capacity
to respond to and shape such an environment
by extending the negotiating practices
of the Cold War into the future. We seek
a new strategic framework in our relationship
with Russia, not a perpetuation of the
old.
Reducing
the Number of Nuclear Warheads
Some now argue that the nuclear weapons removed
from our strategic forces must be destroyed
or the announced reductions would be "a subterfuge."
The NPR, of course, calls for the destruction
of some, but not all of the U.S. warheads
removed from the operationally deployed force.
We must retain these weapons to give the United
States a responsive capability to adjust the
number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons
should the international security environment
change and warrant such action. Presidents
from both parties have long recognized the
need for such a capability. For example, the
previous Administration adopted a "lead and
hedge" policy with regard to reductions below
the levels required by the START II Treaty
in the 1994 NPR. The last Administration planned
to retain the U.S. ability to regenerate capabilities
reduced by the START II Treaty as a "hedge"
against the possibility that Russia might
reverse its course towards democracy. The
previous Administration continued that policy
through its last day in office.
The current Nuclear Posture Review makes a
similarly prudent decision to maintain the
ability to restore capabilities we now plan
to reduce. The difference, however, is that
the NPR's responsive force is not being sized
according to the dictates of a possible resurgence
in the threat from Russia. Instead, our new
responsive capability is being defined according
to how it contributes to the four goals of
dissuading potential adversaries, assuring
allies, deterring aggression, and defeating
enemies. At this time, the appropriate size
of our responsive force has not been determined.
However, the analysis that helped determine
the size of the operationally deployed force
and the decision to pursue non-nuclear capabilities
in the New Triad suggests that our responsive
capability will not need to be as large as
the "hedge" force maintained by the previous
Administration. Given the era of uncertainty
we now face, maintaining a responsive force
is only prudent and consistent with the capabilities-based
approach to our defense planning.
Finally, the pace with which we reduce the
nuclear stockpile will be determined in part
by the state of our infrastructure and the
very real limits of our physical plant and
workforce, which has deteriorated significantly.
For example, the United States today is the
only nuclear weapon state that cannot remanufacture
replacements or produce new nuclear weapons.
Consequently, we are dependent on stored weapons
to maintain the reliability, safety, and credibility
of our stockpile and to guard against the
possibility of a technical or catastrophic
failure in an entire class of nuclear weapons.
Other nuclear states are not bound by this
limitation of their infrastructure. Repairing
the U.S. nuclear infrastructure and building
the responsive infrastructure component of
our New Triad may well permit us to reduce
the size of the nuclear stockpile needed to
support the responsive force.
In sum, the NPR develops an approach to reductions
that provides an accounting of reductions
that reflects "truth in advertising," protects
conventional capabilities from efforts to
limit nuclear arms, and preserves the flexibility
necessary in an era of uncertainty and WMD
proliferation. This is the only prudent path
to deep reductions given the realities of
the threat environment we face.
Programs
Developing and fielding the capabilities for
the New Triad will require a dedicated effort
over the next decade. Program development
activities must be paced and completed in
a manner such that the integration of capabilities
results in the synergistic payoff envisioned
for the New Triad. The Department has identified
an initial slate of program activities that
we propose to fund beginning in FY2003.
DoD
Infrastructure. Funding for the sustainment
of strategic systems will be increased. This
effort will support surveillance and testing
of weapon systems slated for life extension
programs such as the Air-Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) and the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM).
We propose to conduct additional test flights
for solid rocket motors and to increase our
efforts for unique technologies for strategic
systems, such as missile electronics and navigation.
In addition, the Department will fund the
development and qualification of radiation-hardened
parts for strategic systems.
Offensive
Strike. Funding has been programmed for
two specific advanced conventional weapon
applications and one concept development program
to explore options for advanced strike systems.
The two advanced conventional strike applications
include a fast-response, precision-impact,
conventional penetrator for hard and deeply
buried targets and the modification of a strategic
ballistic missile system to enable the deployment
of a non-nuclear payload.
Missile
Defense. The Department will conduct an
aggressive R&D program for ballistic missile
defense and we are evaluating a spectrum of
technologies and deployment options.
Strike
Support. Advancements in offensive and
defensive capabilities alone will be inadequate
without enhancements in sensors and technology
to provide detailed information on adversary
plans, force deployments, and vulnerabilities.
Such systems are critical in developing the
advanced command and control, intelligence,
and adaptive planning capabilities required
to integrate all three legs of our New Triad.
Therefore the Department has proposed additional
funding for the development of advanced sensors
and imagery, for improved intelligence and
assessment, and for modernization of communications
and targeting capabilities in support of evolving
strike concepts.
Conclusion
A half a century ago, in the midst of the
Cold War, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
noted in the House of Commons the "sublime
irony" that in the nuclear age, "safety will
be the sturdy child of terror and survival
the twin brother of annihilation." The Cold
War is long over and new approaches to defense
are overdue. As President Bush has stated,
"We are no longer divided into armed camps,
locked in a careful balance of terror.…Our
times call for new thinking." The New Triad,
outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, responds
to the President's charge.
STATEMENT
OF ADMIRAL JAMES O. ELLIS, USN
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
FEBRUARY 14, 2002
-
Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, Distinguished
Members of the Committee. . . I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify
on the Nuclear Posture Review. As you know this
is my first appearance before this committee
since my confirmation hearing last September.
I am honored to be invited to participate in
this hearing on a major report, the conclusions
of which will reshape and revitalize, respectively,
our strategic policy and capabilities.
As Congress recognized in the Fiscal Year
2001 National Defense Authorization Act, a
periodic comprehensive review of our nation's
strategic posture is appropriate as the national
security environment changes. The last Nuclear
Posture Review was conducted eight years ago
to address how to effectively draw down our
strategic forces in the post-Cold War world.
For a number of reasons, including a rapidly
changing international environment and complex
new national security challenges, the time
is right to again assess our strategic direction.
This Nuclear Posture Review provides that
assessment and, indeed, moves beyond assessment
to provide the initial details of a new direction,
proposing a comprehensive approach that builds
on the Quadrennial Defense Review's strategic
foundation of assure, dissuade, deter, defend
and defeat.
As you know, the Nuclear Posture Review was
conducted by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. US Strategic Command participated
in the review as did the Joint Staff and the
Services, particularly the Air Force and the
Navy. We were consulted on many issues and
provided our expertise as well as our frank
opinions on the report's findings as they
were developed. I am pleased with the Nuclear
Posture Review's balance and focus and look
forward to working with Congress, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
and the Services as we work to implement these
findings in the months ahead.
Many of the details and key issues involving
the Nuclear Posture Review are familiar to
you and have been addressed by others, but
I would, however, like to discuss some of
the key findings from my perspective as the
combatant commander of our Nation's strategic
forces.
Modernization
and Sustainment
The first finding I'd like to highlight is
the recognition of a pressing need for investment
across the full range of our strategic capabilities.
As we work to reduce deployed strategic nuclear
warheads, this investment is needed to sustain
and improve our aging operating forces, to
recapitalize our infrastructure which has
atrophied over the last ten years, and to
refine and enhance current systems. Reductions
of operationally deployed nuclear warheads
to the lowest numbers consistent with national
security, as the President directed, will
require that remaining systems be reliable,
sustainable and, therefore, fully credible.
As you know, our current operating forces,
our intercontinental ballistic missiles, our
bombers, and our strategic ballistic missile
submarines, and their weapons, will remain
the backbone of our strategic strike forces
for at least the next twenty years. These
platforms and their weapon systems are projected
to remain in service well beyond their original
design lives and require significant sustained
investment to monitor and, if necessary, to
replace aging and obsolete components in addition
to more comprehensive overhauls or life extension
programs. The NPR fully recognizes this.
Our operating forces could not be effective
without robust complementary capabilities
including command, control and communications
systems as well as effective intelligence
and planning support. Increased strategic
flexibility and adaptability will require
an equally robust but much more capable nuclear
command and control system. The Nuclear Posture
Review identifies advances in speed and capabilities
in these areas as critical to improving the
capabilities of our strike forces. General
Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has similarly identified improvement
in command and control capabilities as a vital
component of our military's transformation.
I fully support this renewed focus on improving
these military capabilities. Investments in
these areas are critical enablers to not only
strategic forces but our overall military
capability.
As the Secretary of Defense stated in his
testimony last June, our military has been
forced to make increasingly difficult choices
between equally necessary procurement, readiness,
and research and development needs over the
last ten years. Strategic forces have not
been excluded from this trend. The Nuclear
Posture Review recognizes this and recommends
renewed investment in existing and future
operating forces, supporting capabilities
and strategic infrastructure. I fully support
those recommendations. Thankyou for the positive
steps you've already taken in this committee
to provide much needed funding to improve
these capabilities and for your continued
support in this vital area.
Nuclear
Warhead Reductions
A second key finding of the Nuclear Posture
Review is the need for a measured approach
to operationally deployed nuclear warhead
reductions. This approach meets the President's
direction and establishes as a goal the lowest
number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads
consistent with the Nation's national security
needs. I fully support it.
The Nuclear Posture Review directs periodic
assessments to evaluate the strategic environment
and our progress in developing new capabilities
for our strategic forces. These assessments
allow us to respond appropriately to any emerging
threat, dissuade any potential adversary and
provide assurance to our allies of our resolve.
Broader
Definition of Strategic Forces
The third key finding of the Nuclear Posture
Review is the recognition that our strategic
capabilities should not be limited to nuclear
weapons alone. The inclusion of non-nuclear,
and, potentially, non-kinetic capabilities
into our strategic options provides a number
of benefits. First, it helps to raise the
nuclear threshold by providing the President
with strategic options in a crisis or conflict
that do not rely solely on nuclear weapons,
yet still convey the Nation's resolve and
determination. Second, integrating non-nuclear
capabilities into strategic forces strengthens
our joint approach to developing and operating
military forces. In the past, there have often
been unique requirements for nuclear forces
beyond those of conventional forces. Now,
with technological advances, we have the potential
to seamlessly integrate existing or projected
enhancements to non-nuclear capabilities such
as communications, intelligence flow and precision
strike to improve our strategic capabilities.
The integration of what had previously been
considered conventional capabilities into
national strategic plans allows for the development
of responsive, adaptive, and interoperable
joint forces that can be employed in a wider
range of contingencies. There are certainly
challenges associated with incorporating non-nuclear
capabilities into our strategic forces, however,
the benefits far outweigh the concerns.
Operational
Flexibility
The final finding of the Nuclear Posture Review
is the need for more flexible and adaptive
planning in support of our strategic forces.
US Strategic Command is in the process of
developing a more flexible and adaptive planning
system that retains the rigor and expertise
developed over the last forty years, yet employs
modern computing techniques and streamlined
processes to significantly improve our planning
capability for rapid, flexible crisis response
in the face of new national security challenges.
This new approach to planning will require
significantly more collaboration with the
regional combatant commanders as we continue
to better integrate our military capabilities
across the spectrum of conflict.
Conclusion
There are many positive results that will
accrue from the Nuclear Posture Review process.
A comprehensive and focused assessment of
our strategic posture has provided new concepts
that can both allow us to reduce our deployed
nuclear weapons inventory and strengthen our
national security to meet this era's new challenges.
This bold change in direction will allow us
to begin shifting our focus from the number
of launchers and weapon platforms stipulated
by previous treaties and based on latent mistrust
of former adversaries. Instead, we will move
toward significantly lower numbers of operationally
deployed nuclear weapons reflecting our new
relationship with Russia and technologically
transform our strategic posture from a purely
nuclear focus to the broader capabilities
of the New Triad.
The New Triad, when development is complete,
will include improved strategic strike forces,
active and passive defenses, and a responsive
infrastructure all supported by improved command
and control as well as robust intelligence
and planning capabilities. Over the next decade
two of the legs of the NPR's New Triad, defenses
and a responsive infrastructure, will be combined
with a modernized strategic strike force including
nuclear and nonnuclear options. This New Triad
can broaden the definition of strategic forces,
enhance deterrence concepts against a wider
range of threats and offer dramatic improvements
in the speed, accuracy and agility of the
full range of our nation's military response.
I look forward to reporting in the future
on our progress in implementing the findings
of the Nuclear Posture Review as we, together,
reshape our strategic capabilities to meet
the challenges of this new era.
Thank you very much. I welcome your questions.
Statement
of John A. Gordon
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration
U. S. Department of Energy
Before the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. Senate
14 February 2002
- Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to meet with you today
on the Nuclear Posture Review and the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) role
in working with the Department of Defense to
implement it.
The NPR review of future national security
needs, and the nuclear weapons stockpile and
infrastructure required to support it, was
carried out by DoD in close consultation and
cooperation with the NNSA. Secretary Abraham
and I fully endorse Secretary Rumsfeld's December
2001 Report to Congress on the NPR.
The central question that I want to address
today is: What are the implications of the
NPR for nuclear weapons programs? More broadly,
what does NNSA need to do to implement the
findings and recommendations of the NPR? Let
me first give the "short answer," which I
will then develop more fully.
First, the NPR reaffirms that nuclear weapons,
for the foreseeable future, will remain a
key element of U.S. national security strategy.
As a result, NNSA must continue to assure
the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile. Our stockpile stewardship program
is designed to do just that, and to do so
in the absence of nuclear testing.
Second, the NPR reaffirms the stockpile refurbishment
plan agreed previously between DoD and NNSA,
which calls for three warhead refurbishment
programs-the W80, the W76 and the B61-to begin
later this decade. As a result, NNSA must
press ahead with its efforts to reverse the
deterioration of its nuclear weapons infrastructure,
restore lost production capabilities, and
modernize others in order to be ready to begin
those refurbishments on schedule.
This raises a key point-the NPR will not reduce
NNSA's costs or workload anytime soon. Regardless
of the eventual size of the future stockpile,
we will need to meet the agreed timelines,
established with DoD well before the NPR,
to begin refurbishments later this decade
on the three warhead types. In this regard,
near-term costs are driven not by the total
number of warheads to be refurbished, but
by the need to restore production capabilities
in time to carry out the first refurbishment
of each type. Possible cost savings from having
to refurbish fewer warheads for a smaller
stockpile would not be realized until well
into the next decade.
Third, several NNSA initiatives have been
endorsed by the NPR including efforts to:
-
Enhance nuclear test readiness,
-
Reestablish nuclear warhead advanced concepts
teams at the national labs/HQ, and
-
Accelerate preliminary design work on a
modern pit facility (MPF).
Given our multi-year plan to reintroduce program
stability to the enterprise, we believe we
are "on track" to complete acquisition of
the tools and capabilities needed to assure
future stockpile safety and relibility, achieve
the needed restoration and modernization of
the production complex, and implement the
NPR initiatives.
Role
of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise in Achieving
Defense Policy Goals
Let me elaborate more on these matters starting
from "first principles." Four key defense
policy goals were articulated in the Quadrennial
Defense Review and later reaffirmed in the
NPR. Briefly, the goals are to:
-
assure allies and friends by demonstrating
the United States' steadiness of purpose
and capability to fulfill its military commitments,
-
dissuade adversaries from undertaking military
programs or operations that could threaten
U.S. interests or those of allies and friends,
-
deter threats and counter coercion against
the United States, its forces and allies,
and
-
defeat any adversary decisively and defend
against attack if deterrence fails.
In seeking to meet these goals, the NPR has
established as its centerpiece a "New Triad"
of flexible response capabilities consisting
of the following elements:
-
non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities
including systems for command and control,
-
active and passive defenses including ballistic
missile defenses, and
-
R&D and industrial infrastructure needed
to develop, build, and maintain nuclear
offensive forces and defensive systems.
Perhaps more so than in any previous defense
review, this concept of a New Triad reflects
a broad recognition of the importance of a
robust and responsive defense R&D and industrial
base in achieving our overall defense strategy.
The ability of our modern defense industrial
base to bring advanced defense technology
rapidly to the field is well respected internationally
among both friend and foe. The breadth and
scope of the U.S. strategic modernization
program of the early 80's, including the potential
of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) then
in the very early stages of R&D, was key to
causing President Gorbachev in the late 1980's
to seek an end to strategic competition with
the West and an end to the Cold War. The U.S.
defense R&D and industrial base, including
the nuclear weapons complex of national laboratories,
production plants, and test sites that supported
development of sophisticated warheads with
build rates exceeding 1,000 weapons per year,
permitted that modernization program to take
place and was a major factor in reassuring
allies (who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella),
in dissuading, that is, convincing the Soviet
Union that arms competition with the United
States was futile, and in deterring aggression.
Many modern military capabilities evolved
from the legacy of the Manhattan Project,
characterized by the massive application of
science and technology to the problem of developing
and producing the atomic bomb and leading
to later efforts across a range of military
systems. It was not only nuclear and conventional
forces that provided deterrence during the
Cold War, but the latent potential-reflected
in our defense scientific, technical and manufacturing
base-to design and develop ever more advanced
and capable military systems, and the ability
to produce them in great quantities if need
be.
Now that the Cold War is over, how can the
nuclear weapons enterprise act both to reassure
allies, and to dissuade or deter future adversaries?
An enterprise focused on sustainment and sized
to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear deterrent
can provide capabilities to respond to future
strategic challenges. A future competitor
seeking to gain some nuclear advantage would
be forced to conclude that its buildup could
not occur more quickly than the U.S. could
respond. Alternatively, an ability to innovate
and produce small builds of special purpose
weapons, characteristic of a smaller but still
vital nuclear infrastructure, would act to
convince an adversary that it could not expect
to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities.
The development and subsequent modification
of the B61-7 bomb-converting a few of them
into B61-11 earth penetrator weapons-is a
case in point.
Thus, it is not only in-being forces, but
the demonstrable capabilities of the defense
scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure,
of which a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure
is a key part, including its ability to sustain
and adapt, that provides the United States
with the means to respond to new, unexpected,
or emerging threats in a timely manner. This
has served to reassure allies and friends,
dissuade adversaries from strategic competition
with the U.S., and underpin credible deterrence
in a changing security environment.
Supporting
the NPR-Capabilities for a responsive nuclear
weapons enterprise
How far along are we in creating a "responsive
nuclear weapons enterprise?" The answer is:
"We're making progress, but we have a ways
to go."
Over the past decade, our focus has been to
develop means to assess and ensure the safety
and reliability of the aging stockpile absent
underground nuclear testing. We have also
sought to reduce the size of the production
infrastructure, consistent with post-Cold
War force levels, with the goal of modernizing
that smaller infrastructure to assure that
the nation has the capabilities it will need
in the future.(1) The results of these efforts
have been mixed. To date we have been able
to certify stockpile safety and reliability
without underground nuclear testing, but the
capability to do so in the future as the stockpile
continues to age remains uncertain. No advanced
warhead concept development is underway. Past
under investment in the enterprise-in particular,
the production complex-has increased risks
and will limit future options. Currently,
we cannot build and certify plutonium "pits"
and certain secondary components, much less
complete warheads (although we are working
hard to re-establish these capabilities).
Many facilities are in poor condition-some
are unusable-and we have a rapidly aging workforce.
Restoring lost nuclear weapons capabilities,
and modernizing others, will require substantial
investment over the next several years both
to recapitalize laboratory and production
infrastructure, and to strengthen our most
important asset: our people.
The nuclear weapons enterprise that we seek
must: (1) continue to assure stockpile safety,
reliability, and performance, and (2) respond
rapidly and decisively to stockpile "surprise"
or to changes in the international security
environment. Let me address each in turn.
Assure
stockpile safety, reliability, and performance
Since 1995, there has been a Presidential
requirement for an annual assessment of the
safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile
and a determination of whether a nuclear test
is required to resolve any safety or reliability
problem. This is an extensive technical effort
supported by data from non-nuclear experiments,
computer simulations, the nuclear test database,
aggressive and ever-improving surveillance,
extensive peer review by "other lab" design
teams, and independent assessments by others.
To strengthen weapons assessment and certification,
we are seeking fundamental improvement in
our understanding of the physics of nuclear
explosions, including the effects of aging
or remanufacture on weapons system performance.
This requires development of new simulation
capabilities that use large, high-speed computers
and new experimental facilities in areas such
as hydrodynamics testing, materials science,
and high-energy density physics. Campaign
goals for reducing uncertainties in our understanding
of weapons behavior have been established,
and schedules and milestones have been set
to meet these goals as soon as practicable.
Because of the implications for stockpile
certification, and the need to meet warhead
refurbishment milestones, it is important
to keep these campaigns on schedule.
Elements of our program to meet annual certification
requirements are well along and include:
-
Aggressive surveillance to predict and find
problems so that warheads can be refurbished
well before aging degrades safety and reliability,
-
Conduct planned warhead refurbishments on
agreed schedules,
-
Seek to anticipate stockpile problems and
fix them, if possible, before they arise,
and
-
Maintain the required numbers of warheads
in ready state.
Respond
rapidly and decisively to stockpile "surprise"
or to changes in the international security
environment.
The NPR highlighted the importance of a robust
and responsive defense R&D and industrial
base as a key element of the New Triad. Here
we refer to the ability of the enterprise
to anticipate innovations by an adversary
and to counter them before our deterrent is
degraded, and its resilience to unanticipated
events or emerging threats-all the while continuing
to carry out the day-to-day activities in
support of the enduring stockpile. Unanticipated
events could include the catastrophic failure
of a deployed warhead type. Emerging threats
could call for new warhead development, or
support to DoD in uploading the responsive
force. In any case, there are a number of
capabilities and activities that will help
us to hedge an uncertain future including
our ability to:
-
Ensure sufficient reserve or surge capacity
for both the R&D and production,
-
Secure sufficient assets/capabilities (e.g.,
transportation, tritium, etc.) to support
the responsive force,
-
Retain appropriate numbers and types of
weapons at appropriate states of readiness,
to ensure a variety of replacement options,
-
Revitalize nuclear weapons advanced concepts
efforts at the labs and headquarters,
-
Develop and assess strategies for transitioning
the stockpile towards weapons that are intrinsically
easier to maintain and certify, conceivably
without nuclear testing, and
-
Enhance readiness to resume underground
nuclear testing, if required.
A key measure of "responsiveness" is how long
it would take to carry out certain activities
to address stockpile "surprise" or deal with
new or emerging threats. Specific goals are
being established for the following four activities;
our progress towards meeting them will be
an important measure of the success of our
program.
Fix
stockpile problems: The ability to
assess a stockpile problem, once one has been
identified, and then design, develop, implement
and certify a fix will of course depend on
the nature and scope of the problem. For a
relatively major problem, we seek to be able
to assess the problem and establish an implementation
plan-Phases 6.2-6.2A-for the "fix" within
one year, and then to conduct development
and production engineering activities leading
to initial production- Phases 6.3-6.5-within
approximately three years.
New
warhead design, development and initial production:
New or emerging WMD threats from rogue
states make it difficult to predict future
deterrence requirements. If the U.S. is to
have a flexible deterrent, it must be able
to adapt its nuclear forces to changing strategic
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